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 ABSTRACT 
The Development and Testing of a Nonconsequentialist Decision-Making Model     
(May 2004) 
Raed Saber Elaydi, B.S., University of Southern California; 
M.S., Trinity University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Richard W. Woodman 
 
 
New conceptual work in the judgment and decision-making research arena has 
suggested a nonconsequentialist perspective to decision-making.  From this perspective, 
an emphasis is placed on emotions during the decision-making process, specifically 
positing that concurrent emotions may lead to decisions that are nonconsequentialist in 
nature.  In the current study I develop the Nonconsequentialist Decision-Making Model 
(NDMM) and include indecisiveness as a vital construct in the model.  In tune with 
much new research on emotions during the decision-making process, I examine how 
being indecisive is a product of negative concurrent emotions, and how indecisiveness 
affects the decision-making process.  Using a natural decision-making setting, the 
current study had participants discuss the “biggest” decision they are currently facing in 
their lives.  Data was collected regarding indecisiveness, nonconsequentialist 
dysfunctional decisional coping behavior, and decision difficulty.  The findings show 
strong support for the NDMM and the nonconsequentialist perspective.  Furthermore, 
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the indecisiveness construct was measured successfully and showed to be a critical part 
of the decision-making process when dealing with difficult decisions.   
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CHAPTER I                                                                       
INTRODUCTION 
 
The current study successfully tested and found support for a decision-making 
model which serves an alternative to expected utility theory.  I argue that negative 
emotions created by difficult choices lead individuals to make decisions that are not 
based on explicit logic or rational factors.  Current literature in judgment and decision-
making argues a consequentialist perspective, stating that individuals use cognitive 
evaluations of expected outcomes to make a decision.  Consequentialist theories state 
that individuals are not affected by emotions during the decision-making process. 
However, a new stream of research has suggested a nonconsequentialist perspective.  
The nonconsequentialist perspective suggests that decision makers are affected by 
emotions during the decision-making process.  Therefore, the central difference between 
the consequentialist and nonconsequentialist perspectives is whether concurrent 
emotions (i.e., emotions during the decision-making process) affect choice.  These 
emotions during the decision-making process are called concurrent emotions and are 
argued to affect one’s choice selection (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001).   
 
The term “concurrent emotion” is synonymous with anticipatory emotions.  
Loewenstein and colleagues (2001) use the terms anticipatory emotions and anticipated 
emotions to define emotions that occur during the decision-making process and emotions 
that occur after the decision has been made.  The current study will employ the term 
concurrent emotion to describe emotions that are experienced during the decision- 
_______________________________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of The Academy of Management Journal.
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making process. 
Making a difficult decision can define an individual’s identity and what a person 
stands for, which can be an emotional process that causes an individual stress, anxiety, 
and fear.  If we consider the process of difficult decision-making as an emotional 
process, negative concurrent emotions may reach an unmanageable level, and the 
decision maker may begin to focus attention on coping with the emotions rather than the 
difficult decision that initially led to the emotions. 
      The current literature in decision-making argues that difficult decisions can lead to 
the activation of dysfunctional decisional coping behavior (Janis and Mann, 1977; 
Lazarus and Folkman, 1984).  Dysfunctional decisional coping behavior is defined as a 
defective search and appraisal of the situation and choices due to stress (Janis and Mann, 
1977 p82).  However, empirical research has found equivocal results regarding the link 
between difficult decisions and dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors.  I question 
that this link is as simple and direct as it is often portrayed.  The central hypothesis of 
this study is that the relationship between difficult decisions and nonconsequentialist 
dysfunctional coping behavior is mediated by indecisiveness (see Figure 1).  
Indecisiveness is defined as the state of being undecided-uncomfortable in the decision-
making process.  The two components that comprise the indecisiveness construct are (1) 
being stuck in the decision-making process, and (2) having negative concurrent 
emotions.  I argue that including indecisiveness into the model can better clarify the link 
between difficult decisions and dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.  Furthermore, 
this research will develop nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping behavior 
(NDDCB) and suggest that this is a unique dysfunctional decisional coping behavior. 
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       The term nonconsequentialist with regard to decision-making refers to the important 
role emotions play in the decision-making process (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  An 
individual is considered to be engaged in nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional 
coping behavior (NDDCB) when: (a) the decision maker is focusing on the emotions the 
decision has created and not on the choices and the consequences of those choices, and 
(b) the decision maker would rather make a detrimental decision than stay in the 
decision-making process.                                                                                                                                  
…... A simple analogy to the central hypothesis is the idea that dysfunctional decisional 
coping behavior is an escape mechanism, and for one to escape one must first feel 
decisionally imprisoned.  I define the decisional prison as indecisiveness and argue that 
indecisiveness mediates the relationship between difficult decisions and 
nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.  Therefore, individuals 
who display nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping behavior do so because 
they are in a state of indecisiveness and not because of the difficulty of the decision.  
Recent work (Loewenstein et al., 2001) suggests that negative concurrent emotions (i.e., 
fear, anxiety, and dread) occur during the decision-making process itself.  A difficult 
decision may invoke negative concurrent emotions, and this emotional state has an effect 
on the focus and priorities of the decision maker- perhaps leading to a 
nonconsequentialist decision.  A nonconsequentialist decision is a decision committed to 
by the decision maker that under expected utility theory would be considered detrimental 
to the decision maker, and the consequences to this committed choice are more 
detrimental to the decision maker than avoiding the decision or choosing another option.  
It is argued here that individuals make nonconsequentialist decisions due to negative 
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concurrent emotions.   
       A decision maker has three possible choices when making a difficult decision: the  
individual can (a) tolerate and manage the high level of anxiety, fear, and dread 
effectively and make the decision cognitively based on a consequentialist calculus (b) 
become crippled mentally and emotionally by the inability to decide (i.e., maintain a 
state of indecisiveness), or (c) escape from the decision-making process altogether 
(make a decision that is nonconsequentialist but removes the individual from the 
decision-making process).  The last option is escape, which is an attempt to reduce a 
heightened negative emotional state by making a decision based largely on the need to 
reduce negative concurrent emotions and not the original problem per se.  This means 
that the actual act of making a decision functions as a coping behavior in and of itself.  
The traditional assumption that difficult decisions cause dysfunctional decisional coping 
behavior will be expanded to suggest that difficult decisions lead to a state of 
indecisiveness, which then leads to nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping 
behavior.  
       Negative concurrent emotions in the decision-making process are best described as 
dread, fear, and anxiety about a choice.  When a decision maker needs to make a 
decision and experiences negative concurrent emotions about a choice, the 
nonconsequentialist perspective would argue that, even if the probability of negative 
consequences is low, the decision maker might make a decision based on emotions and 
not the expected utility.  A simple example of such a scenario is a person who needs to 
go from Los Angeles to New York immediately, but is afraid of flying.  The person has a 
choice between taking a train or a bus, driving a car, flying, or canceling the trip.  The 
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individual develops negative concurrent emotions (e.g., fear and anxiety) when 
considering flying.  Expected utility theory would predict that the individual would 
choose to fly because flying is statistically safer, faster, and in many cases cheaper than 
the other options.  However, an individual may ultimately choose to drive or not go at all 
due to the negative concurrent emotions felt during the decision-making process.  
           I would also note here that Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggests that anticipatory 
emotions are the result of strong anticipated emotions.  The consequentialist perspectives 
supports the notion of anticipated emotions and states that individuals do not want to fell 
emotions such as regret after they make a decision, and therefore, when making a 
decision attempt to minimize anticipated emotions.  However, as stated earlier 
anticipatory emotions are argued to occur due to anticipated emotions, hence, in every 
nonconsequentialist example of decision-making there will be a consequentialist aspect 
to it.  There will be no nonconsequentialist decision made that is not affected by 
consequentialist thinking.  Although this is a trite example, it speaks to the 
nonconsequentialist perspective and how concurrent emotions may lead to a decision not 
based on consequences, but on deep-seated anxiety, fear and dread. 
           Despite there having been much literature written about decision-making, only a 
small subset of it discusses the difficulty individuals have making important decisions, 
and of this research, only a very small number of studies look at indecision.  Further, the 
judgment and decision-making literature has yet to examine the role of indecisiveness in 
the decision-making process.  Therefore, there is a need for construct development and 
model building with the construct of indecisiveness.  The purpose of the current study is 
to add to our understanding of indecisiveness as an important aspect of the decision-
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making process.  
            How might emotions during the decision-making process (i.e., concurrent 
emotions) play a role when an individual faces a particularly difficult decision?  When 
facing a difficult decision, concurrent emotions may be so overwhelming that the 
individual becomes emotionally paralyzed during the decision-making process.  For 
example, if the decision maker in the previous example knows that flying is safer, faster, 
and cheaper, the decision maker may feel torn between her logic and empirical 
knowledge and her emotions and “gut” feeling not to fly.  Such dissonance may lead to 
the decision maker feeling stuck in the decision-making process, with high levels of 
negative concurrent emotions.  This emotional state would be exceedingly difficult to 
tolerate, and may lead to a dysfunctional outcome.  To study this state seems very 
important when attempting to understand the nonconsequentialist decision-making 
perspective.  Therefore, one must develop a construct that best describes the state where 
the decision maker feels stuck in the decision-making process and has high levels of 
negative concurrent emotions.  
            Work by Jones (1989) suggests that one can categorize a person’s decisional 
situation into four subtypes: decided-comfortable, decided-uncomfortable, undecided-
comfortable, and undecided-uncomfortable.  It seems that the last category undecided-
uncomfortable most resembles the negative concurrent emotions state noted above.  The 
undecided-uncomfortable subtype is a vital piece to our understanding of the 
nonconsequentialist perspective.  Jones’ (1989) categorization was developed to better 
define an indecisive student within the vocational psychology field.  Much work within 
the vocational psychology literature attempts to understand the indecisive “trait” which 
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prevents students from making a career or college choice.  However, the current study 
will look at indecisiveness as a state and argue that it is an important variable in 
understanding the nonconsequentialist perspective in decision-making.   
            The undecided-uncomfortable subtype is the basic definition of indecisiveness.  
If one defines indecisiveness as undecided-uncomfortable, then being stuck in the 
decision-making process is the undecided, and the negative concurrent emotions are the 
uncomfortable.  Deciding not to make a decision (e.g., deciding not to decide or 
avoidance) is different from indecisiveness in that, the decision maker is comfortable not 
making a decision; while, indecisiveness is best described as the decision maker being 
uncomfortable, and wanting to make a decision.   
            Lastly, the link between difficult decisions and indecisiveness may be influenced 
by decisional self-efficacy (see Figure 2).  In general self-efficacy can be defined as an 
individual’s estimation of his/her capacity to orchestrate performance on a specific task 
(Gist & Mitchell, 1992).   Issues of self-efficacy are important in making decisions.  For 
example, Blais’s (2001) study suggests that self-efficacy had a mediating role to 
influence certain dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors.  Decisional self-efficacy is 
decision specific, and focuses on one’s perception of his or her ability to make a decision 
that is beneficial and meets certain objectives and goals.  If an individual does not 
believe he or she is capable of making a decision, the individual has a low level of 
decisional self-efficacy.  Low levels of self-efficacy should magnify the link between a 
difficult decision and indecisiveness.  If one has low decisional self-efficacy, she is more 
likely to be stuck in the decision-making process, allowing for heightened levels of 
negative concurrent emotions (i.e., indecisiveness).  Therefore, I hypothesize that 
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decisional self-efficacy moderates the relationship between difficult decisions and 
indecisiveness.  In sum, difficult decisions (characterized by selection difficulty, 
anticipated regret, and preference instability) lead to indecisiveness, (which is moderated 
by decisional self-efficacy) which then leads to nonconsequentialist dysfunctional 
decisional coping behaviors (see Figure 2).   
Indecisiveness and Management 
There is evidence to show that indecisiveness is growing in our society, and a 
recent report suggests that it is a component of the cultural revolution of our information 
age (Dentsu, 1999).   Dentsu argues that individuals find it easier to live life by always 
maintaining a transient uncommitted condition and allowing themselves to reverse their 
decisions and courses of action.  This report suggests that the institutionalized cultural 
wisdom of not committing to a decision fully will lead to a greater chance of survival in 
today’s difficult times of uncertainty and change (Dentsu, 1999).     
The ubiquitous occurrences of indecision in organizations are important.  
Indecision can give critical insight about CEO and boards of directors’ decision-making 
processes and perceptions.  For example, The CEO of CompUSA, James Halpin, stated 
that his organizational chart looks “very thin on top and very flat (decentralized)… and 
that people should make their own decisions, and if it’s wrong, we’ll go back and fix it; 
but we say, don’t do an indecision.  One of the things I tell the people in our company is, 
if you get fired, make sure its for something you did, not for something you didn’t 
do…Make a decision and move on.  If it’s wrong, we’ll go back and fix it later” (Puffer, 
1999: pg 29).   
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In an organizational context, indecisiveness seems to have gripped some of 
America’s top corporations.  An ABI Inform search showed over 160 popular business 
press articles discussing indecision in organizations.  For example, Charan (2001) 
suggests that many organizations cultivate a culture of indecision, in that members of an 
organization make decisions but do not commit to them, and such decisions tend to be 
reversed later.  Further, when decisions are made, the people responsible for carrying out 
the decisions are not committed to the decisions they agreed on.  Charan (2001) further 
argues that abdication is so rampant in some organizations the decision-making process 
becomes dysfunctional. 
The following dissertation will be broken into six chapters.  Chapter II will look 
at the consequentialist and nonconsequentialist perspectives in decision-making, with a 
specific interest in the nonconsequentialist perspective.  Chapter III will look at each 
component of the Nonconsequentialist Decision-Making Model and theoretically argue 
the links suggested in the model.  The Nonconsequentialist Decision-Making Model was 
tested using a unique methodology discussed in Chapter IV.  In Chapter V I present the 
results and in Chapter VI I discuss those results and then make some closing comments 
regarding the Nonconsequentialist Decision-Making Model and this study’s support of 
the model.      
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CHAPTER II                                                                         
A REVIEW OF CONSEQUENTIALIST AND 
NONCONSEQUENTIALIST DECISION-MAKING PERSPECTIVES 
 
In the following discussion, I will review the consequentialist and 
nonconsequentialist perspective on decision-making and the current state of research in 
these areas.  Second, I will discuss how the nonconsequentialist perspective is centered 
on the concept of concurrent emotions, which is a fundamental component of 
indecisiveness.   
The nonconsequentialist view suggests that individuals can be highly influenced 
by emotions they are experiencing during the decision-making process itself, and these 
emotions may influence decision-making.  This is a unique and evolving perspective that 
lends support to my argument that individuals sometimes make decisions based on the 
unmanageable emotions the decision has created and not the decision itself.  However, 
this new perspective is in contrast to the consequentialist model, which states that 
decisions are based on a decisional calculus.  Therefore, the following discussion on the 
consequentialist perspective will review the theory and highlight limitations of the 
model.      
Consequentialist Perspective on Decision-Making   
Loewenstein et al. (2001) notes that: “Virtually all current theories in decision-
making under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist.”   They use the 
word consequentialist in its general sense to describe how individuals make decisions 
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based on the probability of the consequences of each choice.  The consequentialist 
perspective is represented by expected utility theory (i.e., a prescriptive theory where 
utility = value, and individuals act rationally).   
Expected utility theory sees decision-making as a computational process based 
on (a) expected outcomes and (b) subjective probabilities of choice (see Figure 3).  
Before making a decision, the individual considers the severity and likelihood of 
expected outcomes, and through a subjective (i.e., with error and bias) mental 
mathematical formula attempts to predict the probabilities of all the alternatives.  
Expected utility theory argues that individuals have a strong internal coherence and a 
logical consistency within a map of beliefs and preferences, which allows for a single 
and correct response.  Further, emotions that occur during the decision-making process 
are seen as nonessential.  This perspective suggests that cognitive evaluations of 
information form the totality of how a decision maker processes a risky choice.  This 
perspective does not suggest that emotions do not exist, but rather suggests that they 
occur after the decision has been made, not during the decision-making process itself.  
Janis and Mann (1977) suggest that individuals attempt to minimize post decisional 
emotions during the decision-making process.   
Anticipated Regret 
The consequentialist perspective’s discussion of emotions is limited to 
anticipated regret, which is defined as the decision maker’s desire to minimize future 
anticipated emotions (see Figure 4).  Anticipated regret assumes that during the decision-
making process, individuals imagine and attempt to predict the feelings they will 
experience once the outcome of their decision is known.  Regret is a common anticipated 
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emotion that is cognitively based, negative in nature, and experienced when one 
imagines or realizes that their situation could have been better if they had chosen a 
different course of action (Zeelenberg, 1999).  Anticipated regret does not represent 
emotions experienced during the decision-making process.   
Implicitly, anticipated regret is very much part of the cognitive, consequentialist 
perspective because it attempts to predict the probabilities of future emotions of regret 
and their severity, and then attempts to hedge those unwanted feelings (Loewenstein et 
al., 2001).  This argument was supported by Isen and Geva (1987) who showed how 
individuals in a good mood tend to not gamble so they may maintain their good mood- a 
consequentialist perspective. 
Nonconsequentialist Perspective on Decision-Making  
Recently, theorists have begun to ask the question, how do emotions such as fear, 
stress, and anger influence decisions?  How should such feelings be incorporated in the 
decision-making process (Blais, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2001)?  Nonconsequentialist 
theories support the notion that emotions do influence choice and decision-making, and 
research on this topic has grown rapidly in recent years.   
Early Work 
The symptoms of stress that are often observed at the time of making a difficult 
decision include feelings of apprehensiveness, a desire to escape from the distressing 
choice dilemma, and self blame for having allowed oneself to get into the predicament.  
In a study by Epstein and Fenz (1965), parachutists were asked to rate their subjective 
feelings of stress and anxiety.  They found that the parachutists experienced maximal 
stress while on the ground, the time of the initial decision to participate in the airplane 
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jump.  Feelings of avoidance decreased while in the plane, even though objectively the 
parachutists are closer to the dangerous situation.  Avoidance feelings continued to 
decline when the objective danger was the greatest- during the free fall.  This work 
began the focus on negative concurrent emotions during the decision-making process.      
 Starting with the pioneering experiments by Gerard (1967) and Janis and Mann 
(1977), psycho-physiological reactions support the notion that decisional conflicts 
promote marked increases in stress.  An experiment by Mann, Janice and Chaplan 
(1969) examined college students who were confronted with a choice between two 
unpleasant forms of stimulation, either of which would enable them to fulfill their 
contract with the experiment.  In order to assess emotional tension during the decision 
sequence, each subject’s heart rate was monitored before, during, and after the decision-
making process was complete.  Heart rate increased sharply and was at its highest level 
during announcement or commitment to the choice, and then dropped off rapidly during 
the briefing session.  These records of physiological arousal suggested that the demand 
to commit to a choice acted as a stressor.   
Continuum of Decision-Making Factors 
One way to conceptualize the relationship between framing emotions and 
decision-making is by considering the ideas of Etzioni (1992), who proposed a 
continuum of decision-making factors from normative/affective (N/A) to 
logical/empirical (L/E). Etzioni (1992)  argues that most decisions are made using N/A 
factors, which include L/E skills.  L/E skills are defined as making decisions based on 
objective methods such as scientific method, deduction, or induction.  L/E skills may be 
the normative ideal, but he argues that those factors may not have any greater effect than 
 
   14
the N/A factors.  This is because rarely are we in a situation when information and 
options are objective, complete, and accurate.  Moreover, the model he proposes applies 
to situations in which both the options for changing and not changing a course of action 
carry serious economic, emotional, physical, and psychological risks to the individual.  
The continuum is set so that infusion, which is the concept that a combination of 
the two factors influences the decision, is in the middle of the continuum of N/A and 
L/E.  This can occur when N/A affects how one can make a very poor option seem 
viable, conceivably due to an emotional attachment that brings about an irrational fear.  
It may also occur when N/A factors intrude with the completion of an L/E process 
(Etzioni, 1992).  
Etzioni (1992) suggests that most decisions are decided by or strongly influenced 
by values and emotions, and that people make judgments and decisions within a social 
context that is subjective and normative/affective in nature.  Etzioni notes that 
logical/empirical steps in decision-making are infrequent because most critical and 
important decisions are subjective.  This is an important statement because most critical 
decisions have a certain level of emotions.  It is difficult to imagine a person asking, 
“Should I leave my corporate job and start my own company?” would be void of 
emotions about their current job, and their imagined future self-employment.  These 
emotions may be the critical factors that drive the decision-making process.   
Risk as Emotions 
Recently researchers have looked at the impact of emotions during the choice 
process (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  Loewenstein et al.’s work examined how individuals 
made decisions at a “gut level” and viewed risk as a feeling that overwhelmed them, as 
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opposed to a subjective probability of an expected utility.  The authors suggest that this 
gut level reaction is influenced by both anticipated and experienced emotions.  There are 
three distinctive arguments to the nonconsequentialist model (see Figure 5).  First, the 
model suggests that the intensity and vividness of the potential consequences due to 
personal or vicarious exposure, have a strong impact on how emotions are experienced 
during the decision-making process.  Second, cognitive evaluations lead to affective 
responses, but more importantly, the reverse can affect judgment and choice preference.  
Lastly, the model strongly suggests that feelings may arise without cognitive mediation, 
and that affective responses can mediate cognitive evaluations and behavior (see 
Loewenstein et al., 2001).  Much of the work developed to support the model was done 
in neuroscience, looking at judgment and decision-making from a neurophysiological 
perspective (see Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 
1996).   
In sum, an individual’s emotions can take over before any cognitive processes.  
The individual can react to these emotions without cognition (e.g., jump out of the way 
of a car), or if the immediacy is not needed, he can cognitively process the situation.  
However, in the latter case, these emotions have already flooded one’s consciousness 
thus affecting judgment, perceptions of risk, vividness of consequences, and perceptions 
of probabilities1.  Loewenstein et al. (2001) argues that this perspective (i.e., risk as 
emotions) should have large implications for research on risk and decision-making and 
our understanding of theories such as prospect theory and escalation of commitment.                                   
                                                 
1 LeDoux (1996) states “emotions can flood consciousness…because the wiring of the brain at this point 
in our evolutionary history is such that connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems 
are stronger than connections from the cognitive systems to the emotional systems.”   
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Rational-Emotional Model 
Anderson’s (2003) Rational-Emotional Model (see Figure 6) suggests that 
selection difficulty, anticipated regret, and preference stability directly affect 
dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors, such as status quo bias (i.e., humans 
generally prefer no change), omission (no action bias, inaction inertia), and choice 
deferral (delay).  Anderson (2003) describes decision avoidance as “a tendency to avoid 
making a choice by postponing it or by seeking an easy way out.”  Decision avoidance is 
described as a multiple causation system that includes the antecedents to a difficult 
decision (e.g., selection difficulty), which I elaborate on in this paper.  While decision 
avoidance specifically attempts to differentiate itself from defensive avoidance, the 
Rational-Emotional Model still appears similar to Janis and Mann’s (1977) work, given 
their similar taxonomy.  Anderson’s (2003) Rational-Emotional model was developed 
independently of Etzioni’s model and the two models are different in one important 
instance.  The Rational-Emotional Model incorporates concurrent emotions as a key 
influence in the decision-making process. 
The Rational-Emotional Model (Anderson, 2003) is based on Loewenstein and 
colleagues’ nonconsequentialist perspective, which posits that emotions affect the 
decision-making process and that the individual will either (a) make a choice in an 
attempt to reduce future, anticipated negative emotions, or (b) make a choice based on 
current experienced negative concurrent emotions (e.g., fear, anxiety).  Anderson (2003) 
acknowledges that the decision-making process can be influenced by a combination of 
both anticipated and experienced emotions.  Further, concurrent emotions are partially 
due to task context and person factors.  These include, but are not limited to, decision 
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strategy, attractiveness of option set, cultural values, effort-accuracy trade-off, time 
limitations, attentional focus, and conflict type.   
Summary 
In this section, I have reviewed the consequentialist and nonconsequentialist 
models of decision-making.  Much of the judgment and decision-making literature states 
that emotions do not play an important role in the decision-making process.  However, 
recent work supports the notion that emotions created by the decision can affect the 
decision itself.  From the nonconsequentialist perspective, both anticipated and 
concurrent emotions drive the decision-making process.  In particular, anticipated regret, 
concurrent emotions, and the role of risk seem to play important roles in the decision-
making process.  Lastly, I discussed how feelings influence assessment and elimination 
of choices during decision-making.  These constructs are integral to further our 
understanding of judgment and decision-making.  From this perspective, we can attempt 
to develop a new Nonconsequentialist Model of Decision-Making, and find the role 
indecisiveness plays within this model.   
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CHAPTER III                                                                        
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Emotions Affecting Choice 
Introduction 
The following chapter will introduce and explain the Nonconsequentialist 
Decision-Making Model (NDMM; see Figure 2) and present corresponding hypotheses.  
I will first review work on concurrent emotions to establish a foundation for the 
hypotheses developed using the NDMM.  Lastly, I will describe each component of the 
NDMM, starting from difficult decisions and ending with dysfunctional decisional 
coping behavior.     
Concurrent Emotions 
Literature in clinical psychology suggests that emotions commonly are in conflict 
with cognitive evaluations, and may be the root of certain pathologies of decision-
making and behavior (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  Ness (1994) demonstrated that 
emotional reactions to risky situations often are not in line with the decision maker’s 
cognitive assessment of risk severity.  When such a gap exists between emotional 
reaction and cognitive risk, assessment of the emotional reactions tends to steer and 
dictate behavior.  However, this tendency may be a poor adaptation.  “Fear may lead us 
to slam on the brakes instead of steering into the skid, immobilizes us when we have the 
greatest need for strength, causes sexual dysfunction, insomnia, ulcers, and gives us dry 
mouth and jitters at the very moment when there is the greatest premium on clarity and 
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eloquence” (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  Loewenstein et al. (2001) quotes Barlow (p18), 
an expert in anxiety, as stating that individuals “are well aware that there is little or 
nothing to fear in situations they find so difficult.”  It seems maladaptive that one’s 
emotions can become cruelly intense, at the same time one’s reasoning and rational 
capabilities are fully functional and aware, all the while leaving the individual unable to 
abate or overcome any of the emotions.   
The consequentialist model assumes that these emotional states are evident in all 
contexts of risk, but not a factor in decision-making.  I argue that this is flawed logic; 
one’s emotions do interrupt decisional cognitive processes.  Proposing marriage, going 
to a medical doctor about a lump, terminating an employee, or buying a new home all 
involve a strong emotional element.  In some cases, individuals feel cognitively they 
have made a decision, but soon realize that emotionally that are still in status quo and 
resistant to the decision.  The decision maker feels he or she must conquer their “fear” 
first before acting on their decision.  The need to conquer a fear before making a 
decision explicitly suggests that emotions are a large part of the decision-making 
process.    
Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggests that we look at emotions as advantageous in 
the decision-making process, as opposed to a passion that may lead the decision maker 
to a poor choice.  However, I will later discuss that at times emotions may lead to 
indecisiveness when the decision maker feels “stuck” in the decision-making process.  
The perspective that emotions can be advantageous is based in large part on work done 
in the fields of neuroscience and social psychology.  This somatic reaction (i.e., visceral 
noncognitive reactions) occurs when affective reactions are quicker and simpler than 
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cognitive reactions.  Such somatic reactions are a crude but effective first assessment of 
threats and options, without the need to ignore one’s environment momentarily and think 
(Damasio, 1994).  This is done when “the direct pathway is not subject to this type of 
filtering (cognitive processing of relevant and irrelevant information), and therefore will 
transmit the information about the threatening stimulus to the amygdala2, regardless of 
whether or not the stimulus occurs in the focus of attention (Armony, Servan-Schrieber, 
Cohen, & LeDoux, 1997 quoted in Loewenstein et al., 2001, pg. 268).”  LeDoux (1996) 
states that the amygdala triggers the release of adrenaline and other hormones into the 
blood stream, which elevates an avoidance response and more importantly disrupts the 
control of rational thought.  Further, this view argues that somatic reactions to 
threatening stimulus (such as risk) may not be seen or brought to one’s focus by the 
cortical systems, perhaps due to subtle environmental cues, but are still experienced 
viscerally (see Loewenstein et al., 2001for a full review).  Recall, the feelings 
experienced during the decision-making process are called concurrent emotions.  
Therefore, evidence supports the notion that, risk can be assessed by non-cognitive, 
somatic processes that, for our purposes, will be defined as emotions of risk.  Hence, 
some individuals assess choices and make decisions based on somatic feelings 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). 
                                                 
2 Amygdala is a primeval arousal center, in the human neuro structure, which is central to the expression 
of negative emotions, and is central to producing and responding to nonverbal signs of anger, avoidance, 
defensiveness, and fear.  Behavioral examples that the amygdala produces are the freeze reaction, sweaty 
palms, and the tense-mouth. Givens (2001) notes that “working through the hypothalamus, the amygdala 
releases excitatory hormones into circulating blood… After surgical removal of the amygdala, growls, 
screams, angry voices, and other negative signs may lose their meaning and become incomprehensible as 
afferent cues.” 
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Summary 
The seminal piece of work by Janis and Mann (1977) suggests that difficult 
decisions lead to coping behavior.  Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) work tested by Blais 
(2001) further supports the notion that difficult decisions directly affect dysfunctional 
decisional coping behavior, but in certain contexts this is moderated by decisional self-
efficacy.  Blais (2001) sees stress as the focal antecedent linking difficult decisions with 
coping behavior.  Further, there has been much work done recently on coping behavior, 
and the assumption that difficult decisions lead to coping behavior has been consistently 
supported by the literature.  From the Janis and Mann (1977) and Anderson (2003) view, 
if the individual identifies no possible realistic alternatives, he/she engages in defensive 
avoidance/decision avoidance (both coping behaviors), suggesting a direct link between 
the difficult decision and coping behavior. 
Indecisiveness 
Making a decision with serious ramifications to the decision maker3 coalesces 
and gives real form to various aspects of one’s life and identity.  Individuals who fall 
into the indecisiveness state are weakening their understanding of themselves, their 
preferences, efficacy, and direction.  These individuals may use nonconsequentialist 
dysfunctional decisional coping behavior to shun ownership of their lives, and become 
less involved in the direction, input, and development of their decisions and actions.  
                                                 
3 Janis and Mann (1977) define a decision with outcomes that have serious ramifications for the decision 
maker as to include those decisions “that evoke some degree of concern or anxiety in the decision maker 
about the possibility that he may not gain the objectives he is seeking or that he may become saddled with 
the costs that are higher than he can afford, either for himself personally or for a group or organization 
with which he is affiliated” (p. 69). 
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Much literature in the vocational and counseling psychology field maintains this line of 
thought. 
Further, indecisiveness is debilitating.  Obsessional indecision (Dunne & Llamas, 
1998) is argued to be a “pure” obsessional disorder.  Obsessional indecision occurs due 
to one’s inability to overcome overvalued ideas, move past worry time, and solve 
problems within a sufficient time frame (Dunne & Llamas, 1998).  Lamprell’s study of 
the paralysis of indecision in his clients suggests that indecisiveness is a “resistance to 
change…being apparently incapable of enthusiasm, commitment or excitement 
(Lamprell, 1989).”  This state leads individuals to perpetually weigh pros and cons with 
the perception that movement in any direction is impossible (Lamprell, 1989).  
       Indecisiveness, which inflicts societies, organizations, and individuals, is a 
phenomenon that needs to be better understood.  However, according to Psychinfo and 
ABIinform (both electronic databases of journals, dissertations and books), there are only 
a few empirical or theoretical publications on indecision or indecisiveness4, with a 
majority of these coming from counseling psychology.  Therefore, I will further define 
indecisiveness in terms of what indecisiveness is, what it is not, and how the construct 
has been confounded with other constructs in the decision-making literature.    
Defining Indecisiveness  
Indecisiveness occurs when an individual is in the process of making a decision 
and is unable to decide.  The decision maker becomes stuck in the process, triggering 
high levels of psychological discomfort that transcends the need to make a functional 
                                                 
4 I noted earlier that an ABI Inform search resulted in over 160 popular business press articles (e.g., 
Forbes, Business Week, and Wall Street Journal to name a few).  However, when the search was limited to 
peer reviewed journals only a few articles directly or indirectly discussed indecision.  
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decision.  Simply, indecisiveness is a decisional prison where one is caught in a 
decision-making process that creates high levels of emotional discomfort.  The 
overwhelming emotional paralysis and discomfort of not being able to decide leads 
individuals to use dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors to escape.  From this 
discussion, the relationship between indecisiveness and nonconsequentialist 
dysfunctional decisional coping behavior seems to be important for our understanding of 
the decision-making process.      
 
Hypothesis 1: Indecisiveness is positively related to  
                 dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors.   
   
Confounding Indecisiveness  
Janis and Mann’s (1977) conflict theory model of decision-making has been one 
of the most influential models in decision-making research.  Although the authors 
highlight much of the essence of indecisiveness, they neglect to mention indecisiveness 
as a topic itself.  Janis and Mann (1977) posit that difficult decisions are made when one 
gains information that is a threat to the individual’s current state of mind, which may 
then result in feelings of apprehensiveness, leading to a desire to escape from making a 
distressing choice.  They argue that the greater the losses anticipated, the greater the 
stress and the greater the commitment an individual has to the current course of action.  
Though not speaking specifically to indecisiveness, the emotional state they discuss is 
comparable to the construct of indecisiveness.   
The major subjective characteristic of Janis and Mann’s work on decisional 
conflict is labeled as an ‘unpleasant feeling of distress.’  They state that intense conflicts 
are likely to arise when a person has to make an important decision, such as whether to 
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get married, sign a business contract, or agree to political compromise.  Such conflicts 
become heightened as a decision-maker becomes aware of the risks associated with 
suffering serious losses from whatever course of action he or she chooses.  This 
contributes to the intensity of decisional conflict.  Decisional conflict is described as 
simultaneously imposed tendencies within the individual to accept and reject the given 
course of action.  In addition, there are difficulties in reversing long-term decisions such 
as those mentioned above.  The most prominent symptoms of such conflicts are 
hesitation, feelings of uncertainty, and signs of acute emotional stress.  Janis and Mann 
(1977) discussed indecisiveness without ever using the word, most likely because the 
construct was largely confounded with the concept of defensive avoidance.    
The indecisiveness construct has not been developed in the judgment and 
decision-making literature, because as noted above it may be subsumed and imbricated 
with dysfunctional decisional coping behavior constructs.  Therefore, issues of construct 
validity arise with regard to what dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors are, how 
they are different from indecisiveness, and why indecisiveness is confounded with 
dysfunctional decisional coping behavior in the decision-making process.   
Existing indecisiveness scales appear to be measuring the same construct of 
dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.  Many different fields have indirectly studied 
the construct of indecision.  However, the construct has not been directly attended to in 
any literature except in the field of vocational and counseling psychology.  Anderson 
(2003) suggests that decisional avoidance tended to be subsumed into other constructs in 
each given field.  Indecisiveness, a similar construct, seems to have met a similar fate.  
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Mann, Burnett, Radford and Ford’s (1997) development of a questionnaire  
(Melbourne Decision-making Questionnaire or MDMQ) based on Janis and Mann’s 
(1977) work on critical decision-making is the current seminal work on operationalizing 
dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.  The MDMQ is the culmination of twenty 
years of development and refinement (Mann, Beswick, Allouache, & Ivey, 1989; Mann 
et al., 1997; Motowidlo, Packard, & Manning, 1986), attempting to operationalize the 
original Janis and Mann model.   However, it seems that the questions in the MDMQ 
look very similar to questions on indecisiveness (Brisbin, 1992; Brisbin & Savickas, 
1994; Gati, Krausz, & Osipow, 1996; Haraburda, 1999; Lancaster, Rudolph, Perkins, & 
Patten, 1999; Leong & Chervinko, 1996).    
Furthermore, the MDMQ (Mann et al., 1997) seems to load greater when the 
coping behaviors are grouped together (defined as non-vigilant) when running a 
confirmatory factor analysis, rather than when they are independent.  Mann et al. (1997)  
tested a variant model of the MDMQ because of the high levels of loading between the 
different dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors.  They found that vigilance is 
designated as a first-order factor and non-vigilance as a second-order factor with three 
constituents loading on the factors- buck-passing, procrastination, and hypervigilance.  
The study showed, using confirmatory factor analysis, that using the two-factor model 
(e.g., vigilant vs. non-vigilant) had an identical fit (goodness of fit = 0.92, adjusted GFI 
= 0.90, Root-Mean-Square Residual = 0.05, X2/df 9.34) to the four-factor model 
(goodness of fit = 0.92, adjusted GFI = 0.90, Root-Mean-Square Residual = 0.05, X2/df 
9.01).  The findings suggest two important points: (1) indecisiveness and dysfunctional 
decisional coping behavior items may be confounded and, therefore, the reason why we 
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cannot differentiate between the constructs is because indecisiveness is captured in all 
types of dysfunctional decisional coping behavior and, (2) indecisiveness scales and 
dysfunctional decisional coping behavior scales seem to be measuring the same 
construct.    
Flinders 1982 Decision-Making Questionnaire, the questionnaire that preceded 
the MDMQ, also suggests that there are high intercorrelations between hypervigilance, 
defensive avoidance, and three defensive avoidance scales (Radford, 1982).   Other 
empirical research such as Mann et al.’s (1989) work took this into account and did not 
break up non-vigilance.  Mann et al. used a single non-vigilant construct by creating a 
25-item scale labeled “maladaptive coping” which combined hyper-vigilance, defensive 
avoidance, procrastination, buck-passing, and rationalization.   This gives further 
credence to the idea that different types of dysfunctional decisional coping behavior 
scales may perhaps be testing indecisiveness.   
Further, Burnett, Mann, and Beswick (1989) used three DMQ scales (e.g., 
vigilance, hypervigilance, and defensive avoidance) to test competence of students' 
course planning and satisfaction. The study found a significant positive relationship 
between decision vigilance and course planning and satisfaction.  Further, Fletcher and 
Wearing (1992) suggest that decision vigilance is associated with detailed planning, 
while hypervigilance and defensive avoidance are associated with superficial planning 
and post-decision regret.  This makes sense for both studies and gives credence to the 
idea that non-vigilance (i.e., defensive avoidance) greatly taps into the indecisiveness 
construct.  Therefore, teasing out dysfunctional decisional coping behavior and 
indecisiveness into separate constructs with a separate measurement instrument is a vital 
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first step in resolving this discrepancy in the literature.  Furthermore, the basic premise 
of this study is to test the Nonconsequentialist Decision-Making Model.  The model 
hypothesizes that indecisiveness mediates the relationship between difficult decisions 
and nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.  It is vital to this 
study and the Nonconsequentialist Decision-Making Model to show that difficult 
decisions and indecisiveness are separate constructs, and more importantly that 
indecisiveness is separate from dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors.  
All three of the above dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors (e.g., 
abdication/buck-passing, procrastination, and hypervigilance) appear to have similar 
items when compared to the indecisiveness scales.  Thus including a valid measure of 
indecisiveness in a judgment and decision-making model would allow for greater 
explanatory power.  The different dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors (e.g., 
abdication/buck-passing, procrastination, and hypervigilance) have not exhibited any 
discriminant validity when using confirmatory factor analysis, and this again may be due 
to each dysfunctional decisional coping behavior subsuming a certain level of 
indecisiveness within its construct.  
       I posit that non-vigilance questions used in the aforementioned research scales tap 
into a great deal of the decisional prison state of indecisiveness.  I have attempted to 
build a model in which indecisiveness is separated from the dysfunctional decisional 
coping behavior, allowing higher levels of discriminant validity between different 
coping behaviors.  This will allow for a more precise and complete understanding of the 
effects of difficult decisions, indecisiveness, and dysfunctional decisional coping 
behavior.      
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Nonconsequentialist Dysfunctional Decisional Coping Behavior  
Introduction 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) suggest two coping behaviors (not in the context of 
decision-making) (1) regulation of emotions or distress (i.e., emotion-focused coping), 
and (2) management of the problem at the origin of the emotions/distress (i.e., problem-
focused coping).  Further, Janis and Mann (1977)  suggest four dysfunctional decisional 
coping behaviors (1) shifting responsibility (i.e., abdication) (2) bolstering (i.e., in a 
biased manner the decision maker seeks reasons to support an inferior course of action), 
(3)  hypervigilance (i.e., failing to recognize all the alternatives, not using remaining 
available time to evaluate alternatives, and frantically looking for a solution, going 
through a number of alternatives, and then making a hastily contrived solution that only 
seems to promise an immediate solution) and (4) vigilance (i.e., clarifying objectives, 
considering alternatives, evaluating consequences, and strategically thinking how to 
implement chosen options).  Mann et al. (1997) suggests that Lazarus and Folkman’s 
(1984) two coping behaviors (i.e., problem and emotion-focused) are comparable to 
Janis and Mann's (1977) four (i.e., shifting responsibility, bolstering, hypervigilance, 
vigilance).  Mann and colleagues also note that problem-focused coping is similar to the 
vigilance construct, and that emotion-focused coping, such as denial and distancing to 
reduce the worry, are parallel to defensive avoidance (i.e., shifting responsibility, 
bolstering and hypervigilance).   
Based on Janis and Mann (1977) and Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) definitions 
of vigilance and problem-focused coping, respectively, I define decisional coping 
behavior in its healthiest form as one’s ability to use realistic and flexible thoughts and 
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acts to solve problems and make decisions (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).   However, in its 
dysfunctional form I use the more traditional definition of dysfunctional decisional 
coping behavior, which is best described as an escape mechanism.   
The following section makes the distinction between functional coping (i.e., 
vigilant and problem-focused) and dysfunctional coping (i.e., emotion-focused coping) 
during the decision-making process.  Dysfunctional coping is the basis for the 
development of the NDDCB construct, and will be discussed in the following paragraphs 
at length.  On the other hand, functional coping is the ability to make decisions in a 
functional healthy way, and will not be essential to our understanding of the 
Nonconsequentialist Decision-Making Model.  However, functional coping will be 
discussed as a dialectic to better understand dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.   
The Nonconsequentialist Decision-Making Model suggests a new type of 
dysfunctional decisional coping behavior called nonconsequentialist dysfunctional 
decisional coping behavior (NDDCB).  NDDCB is an escape mechanism that parallels 
emotion-focused coping.  The distinction of the NDDCB is it specifically refers to 
coping in the context of the decision-making process.  Three components define a 
nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.  First, an individual must 
be attempting to make a decision.  Second, the decision maker’s focus is on coping with 
the emotions the decision itself has created, and not necessarily the decision and its 
consequences.  Third, the decision maker commits to a decision to reduce or negate 
negative concurrent emotions, and tends to close his eyes to the consequences of the 
choice.     
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Functional Coping Behaviors 
  Janis and Mann (1977) suggest that individuals under manageable 
circumstances make vigilant decisions, whereas Lazarus and Folkman (1984) suggest 
under similar circumstances individuals make problem-focused decisions.  Mann et al. 
(1997) suggest that there is great parallel between the concept of problem focused 
coping and Janis and Mann’s (1977) notions of vigilance.  Functional coping in 
decision-making occurs often, and is noted here to differ from the topic of this study, 
which is predicting nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.   
Vigilance occurs when the decision maker makes clear the objectives to be 
accomplished, is able to survey a spectrum of choices, effectively explores relevant 
information, absorbs and comprehends the information with an unbiased view, and 
assesses the choices meticulously prior to making a decision.  Vigilance is correlated 
with a medium psychological stress level.  Janis and Mann’s (1977) conflict model 
suggests that it is the single coping pattern that leads to “sound and rational decision 
making”(Mann et al., 1997). 
Problem-focused coping strategies focus on objective and analytical processes or 
motivational or cognitive solutions.  Objective and analytical processes can be defined as 
the attempt to generate good solutions and weigh alternatives to the problem.  Examples 
of cognitive and motivational solutions can be defined as the ability to develop and learn 
new skills.  As mentioned previously, functional decision-making occurs often, but it is 
the dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors and difficult decisions that are the focus of 
the research reported here.  
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Dysfunctional Coping Behaviors  
According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), the decision maker first appraises the 
situation before reverting to dysfunctional coping behavior.  Appraisals are perhaps 
synonymous with “judgment” in the judgment and decision-making literature.  
Therefore, to understand the current literature on coping behavior we must look at 
appraisals.  
Appraisals 
In order to determine the degree of stress experienced in a situation Lazarus and 
Folkman’s (1984) work on stress and coping discuss a two-tier appraisal process.  This 
and additional work done by Lazarus (1966) has been among the seminal pieces in 
psychology regarding stress.  According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), stress is 
defined as “a particular relationship between the person and the environment that is 
appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his 
or her well-being” (p.19).  Further, Folkman (1984) distinguishes between appraisals and 
coping behavior by arguing that coping is defined as “constantly changing cognitive and 
behavioral efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised 
as taxing or exceeding the resources of a person” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).   
Appraisals occur at two levels, and each level can interact with the other to 
determine one’s objective level of stress.  Appraisals assess a situation to determine the 
level of potential harm or threat.  The appraisal is not a simple perception of the 
situational elements but a judgment or an inference that is affected by the appraiser’s 
knowledge and beliefs (Lazarus, 1966).   
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The primary appraisal level takes into account the stakes of the outcome (i.e., 
will something negative or positive happen to me) (Lazarus, 1991).  If the situation is 
defined as stressful, it can be categorized as harm/loss—the individual has already been 
hurt or experienced a loss in some manner; threat—the individual is anticipating being 
hurt or losing something; and challenge—an individual anticipates a potential profit or 
improvement of one’s situation.  There is evidence that the primary appraisals of threat 
and challenge have direct effects on coping behaviors (Blais, 2001), and that appraisals 
of challenge are positively related to the use of problem-focused coping behaviors. 
Appraisals of threat are positively related to emotion-focused behaviors (Peacock, 
Wong, & Reker, 1992).   
Secondary appraisals assess which coping options would optimize one’s 
situation.  Secondary appraisals focus on the evaluation process of resources and options 
that the highly stressed individual has to deal with.  The most common secondary 
appraisal is decisional self-efficacy.  Concerning this study, decisional self-efficacy is 
hypothesized to be a moderator between difficult decisions and indecisiveness (see 
Figure 2).    
Coping is not an appraisal, but an effort to manage a stressful situation, with its 
key feature being that when a person is coping he is not solely interested in the outcome 
of the situation.  Further, regardless of the expected loss/damage or gain/profit of the 
coping behavior, coping can include any thought or act that negates the stress of the 
situation.  Accordingly, emotion-focused coping deals with the regulation of emotions, 
cognitive processes, and behavioral strategies.  Cognitive processes are aimed at 
lessoning emotional distress using behavioral strategies such as distancing oneself from 
 
   33
a situation, minimization, and avoidance of a situation.  
            Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) two-tier model of appraisals has been studied at 
length by clinical, personality, and social psychology researchers, however the literature 
has not been linked until recently to the decision-making processes.  Blais’ (2001) work 
(c.f., Lazarus and Folkman, 1984) suggests a direct link between difficult decisions and 
dysfunctional decisional coping behavior, and also notes that for certain decision types, 
decisional self-efficacy mediates difficult decisions and dysfunctional decisional coping 
behavior.  Her work suggests that difficult decisions have a direct and indirect effect on 
coping behavior, due to a person’s appraisal (operationalized by Blais as decisional self-
efficacy).  Though Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) perspective states that primary 
appraisals of threat and challenge are mediated by secondary appraisals, only self-
efficacy had a partially mediating role in influencing coping in Blais’s (2001) study.  
Terry (1991; 1994)  supplements Blais’s work by suggesting that decisional (i.e., 
situational) self-efficacy, accounted for most of the variance in cautiousness, escapism, 
and self-blame coping behaviors compared with primary appraisals of stressfulness.     
Janis and Mann’s (1977) model states that individuals that perceive to have no 
possible realistic alternatives engage in defensive avoidance (i.e., shifting responsibility, 
bolstering, hypervigilance), arguing a direct effect between the difficult decisions and 
coping behavior.  Therefore, both Janis and Mann’s (1977) and Lazarus and Folkman’s 
(1984) models suggest that difficult decisions lead to dysfunctional decisional coping 
behaviors.  
Further, Anderson (2003) suggests that the decision maker attempts to minimize 
these experienced concurrent emotions through some form of coping.  Both anticipated 
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and concurrent emotions can influence choice in a fully computational, goal-based 
manner (see Figure 6).  Further, Anderson allows for individuals to not choose any of the 
alternatives, which is a behavioral option that is used to reduce anticipatory emotion 
(e.g., Luce, 1998; Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997).   
Difficult Decisions 
There are no universally difficult decisions; difficult decisions are based on the 
decision maker’s perception of the decision and their choices.  There are many reasons 
why a person may perceive a decision as difficult.  So, what makes a decision difficult?  
I propose that there are three factors that make up a difficult decision: anticipated regret, 
selection difficulty, and preference instability.  These three factors are derived from 
conceptual work by Janis and Mann (1977) and Anderson (2003).  The three factors 
trigger high levels of emotional conflict and it is this overwhelming emotional conflict 
that pushes the decision maker into the indecisiveness state, leading to the notion that 
indecisiveness mediates the relationship between difficult decisions and dysfunctional 
decisional coping behavior.  I will now turn to discussing the three factors that comprise 
a difficult decision in more detail.   
Three Factors of Difficult Decisions   
Anticipated Regret 
As previously discussed, during the decision-making process, individuals 
imagine and attempt to predict the feelings they will experience once the outcome of 
their decision is known.  When individuals have choices, they do not want to feel regret 
after they make a decision.  Thus, being aware of this potential regret, the decision 
maker attempts to make a choice that minimizes this regret.  Anticipated regret is a 
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combination of an imagined lost opportunity and a negative consequence.  Anticipated 
regret does not represent emotions during the decision-making process.  However, many 
negative concurrent emotions such as dread, anxiety, and regret are derived from 
anticipated regret.  
Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggests that it is not anticipated emotions alone, but 
also concurrent emotions that have an effect on risky choice.  Loewenstein et al. and 
colleagues conclude from their work that concurrent emotions phenomenologically refer 
to potential future outcomes in the same manner as anticipated regret.  However, in 
concurrent emotions, the emotional encounter occurs during the decision-making 
process, opposed to the mentally simulated future (Anderson, 2003).   
During the decision-making process, concurrent emotions may detract the 
individual from making a good decision because he or she is coping with their emotions 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001).  Negative concurrent emotions, such as fear, dread, and 
anxiety may overwhelm the decision maker and lead to an indecisiveness state (to be 
described in more detail later).  This is not to be confused with anticipated regret, which 
occurs when individuals attempt to minimize their future regret in decision-making.  The 
importance in making the distinction between concurrent emotions and anticipated 
regret is that indecisiveness refers to emotions that arise during the decision-making 
process and the inability to manage those emotions.   
For example, an individual has to make a decision whether or not to buy a new 
home.  Concurrent emotions occur during the decision-making process, and the 
individual feels emotionally overwhelmed and distraught about the decision to buy a 
new house.  Is buying a new home the right decision?  Is it too risky?  How will he/she 
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feel after making the decision?  If the individual is experiencing anticipated regret, 
he/she is also likely to be experiencing concurrent emotions (fear, anxiety, and 
apprehension).   
Hypothesis 2: Anticipated regret is positively related to  
                  indecisiveness. 
 
Preference Instability  
Preference instability5 is a dynamic and understudied construct, which describes 
the extent to which one’s preferences change during the decision-making process.  If an 
individual changes their mind frequently about which choice they prefer, this contributes 
to the label of a difficult decision.  This vacillation may trigger a heightened level of 
negative concurrent emotions.  These heightened levels of negative concurrent emotions 
in conjunction with one’s inability to decide (i.e., stuck in the decision-making process) 
may lead to a state of indecisiveness.  In support of this, Callanan and Greenhaus (1990) 
demonstrated that indecision (defined differently than indecisiveness) occurs when an 
employee has difficulty selecting an appropriate goal.   
Ambivalence, a similar construct to preference instability, is construed as a state 
of indecision that is categorized as approach-avoidance (e.g., a good job in a bad city).  
Webster defines ambivalence as “[un]certainty or fluctuation, especially when caused by 
inability to make a choice or by a simultaneous desire to say or do two opposite or 
conflicting things, simultaneous and contradictory attitudes or feelings (as attraction and 
repulsion) toward an object, person, or action…continual fluctuation (as between one 
                                                 
5 This differs from Anderson’s (2003) concept of preference stability, where he posits that  
individuals tend to have very stable preferences, and choose the status quo or no change option  
when making a decision.   
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thing and its opposite), uncertainty as to which approach to follow.”  Therefore, 
ambivalence can be considered a subset of a form of preference instability.    
An example of preference instability can be seen in top academic and/or athletic 
high school prospects attempting to choose a university to attend.  The student has 
received numerous scholarships to many schools across the country.  The student may 
fall into a state of indecisiveness due to the constant preference change he/she goes 
through when visiting each school.   
Hypothesis 3: Preference instability is positively related  
                  to indecisiveness. 
 
 
Selection Difficulty  
Selection difficulty is defined and comprised by three components (e.g., 
preference uncertainty, poor structure, and incomparable alternatives) that I will define 
in detail in the following paragraphs   Using concepts developed by Anderson (2003) I 
suggest that selection difficulty leads to indecisiveness when the decision maker (a) 
lacks a reason to choose one of the options, (b) has a certain and specific goal but is 
unsure of the best choice to attain that goal  (i.e. preference uncertainty), and (c) the 
decision itself is ill defined and lacks structure.  I will further elaborate on each of these 
three factors that lead to selection difficulty.  
Preference Uncertainty.  Preference uncertainty, similar to lack of reason, is centered 
on one’s ability to define oneself and one's preferences.  Having a clear goal but not 
knowing which choice will best reach that goal describes preference uncertainty.  
Anderson (2003) defines preference uncertainty as “a state of being unsure regarding 
which of two options meets ones' goals or criteria for the best choice.” However, the 
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question remains as to whether it is the inability to select a strategy or the uncertainty 
expressed about a selected goal, which may lead to indecision in strategic decisions.    
Being stuck in the decision-making process and feeling uncomfortable may arise due 
to situational factors that lead to mutually exclusive outcomes.  Mutually exclusive 
outcomes may occur within an individual due to goal, cognitive or affective conflict.  
There are three subtypes of intrapersonal conflict particularly relevant to understanding 
indecision: approach-approach, avoidance-avoidance, and approach-avoidance conflict 
(Locke, Smith, Erez, Chah, & Schaffer, 1994).  Approach-approach conflict occurs when 
there are two or more options that lead to possible positive outcomes (e.g. two good job 
offers).  Approach-avoidance and avoidance-avoidance situations may lead individuals 
to not know what their preferences are (i.e., preference uncertainty).  Avoidance-
avoidance conflict occurs when two or more options have a negative outcome (e.g. take 
a decrease in pay or get laid-off).  However, the complexities of most situations lead 
many individuals to have options that lead to both positive and negative emotions.  In 
these circumstances, an approach-avoidance conflict arises and indecision is likely to 
occur.  The approach-avoidance conflict occurs when each option has both a positive 
and negative aspect (e.g. taking a good job in a bad city).   
       Preference uncertainty is different from preference instability because the latter 
focuses on having goals and criteria and then changing them, while the former focuses 
on the options and whether those options will meet one’s goals and criteria.  Simply put, 
with preference uncertainty, the decision maker has goals she wants to achieve but is 
unsure how to differentiate whether choice A or choice B will meet the decision maker’s 
goals.  Hence, the focus is how to attain one’s goals.  In contrast, preference instability 
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focuses on differentiating one’s goals and solidifying values on the goals to make the 
decision.  Therefore, the decision maker is very aware of which choice will lead to the 
fulfillment of which goals.  In the example of the high school student choosing a 
university, under preference uncertainty the student may not know which school will be 
best suited to attain her goal of getting into medical school.  By contrast, with preference 
instability, the individual knows that attending university A will allow her to attain her 
goal of being a doctor and university B will train her in law, but she changes her mind 
daily on whether to become a doctor or a lawyer.   
 
Hypothesis 4:  Preference uncertainty is positively related to  
                       indecisiveness.  
 
Poorly Structured Decision.  Anderson (2003) notes that unstructured, ill-defined 
decisions lead to selection difficulty.  He states:  
This structure is usually revealed in the degree to which 
algorithmic methods can be applied to produce a solution.  In a 
well-defined problem, the relevant variables are known, their 
values are retrievable, and the process of combining this 
information is mechanical and guaranteed to produce a solution 
of a determined nature.  Many decisions lack these attributes and 
are, consequently, more difficult.  This difficulty is produced by 
doubt about the relevance, accuracy, or use of information one 
has acquired that is assumed to be relevant to the decision  
(Anderson, 2003). 
 
One situational factor that makes decisions difficult and may lead to 
indecisiveness is role ambiguity.  Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek and Rosenthal’s (1964) 
study suggests that role ambiguity is a source of job-related distress.  In a qualitative 
study (Bartunek, 1993), a new director in the initial weeks of her job was stricken by 
indecision. “Her uncertainty about what she was doing in her role…the academic 
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director had been hesitant to be very assertive.  She said the principle told her ‘you’re so 
afraid of stepping on toes you haven’t done anything (Bartunek, 1993).”  Poor 
clarification of one’s functional role, expectations, and the manner in which to gather 
reliable information may make a decision difficult to the decision maker.   
Hypothesis 5: Poorly structured decisions are positively related to  
                      indecisiveness. 
 
Incomparable Alternatives.  For an individual to make a decision he/she must 
first make a judgment about the quality of options, the context in which the decision is 
being made, and his/her preferences.  Lacking a reason to choose an option occurs when 
an individual is unable, incapable, or has not spent enough time in the development of a 
judgment.  Without a discernable judgment on the decision and its options, the decision 
maker has no justifiable reason to act.  Schick (1997) states that reason is a cognitive 
evaluation of an option, its motivational orientation towards results, and the predicted 
results of that option (Anderson, 2003).  Anderson speaks of this:  
Most options suggests developing a reason to make a decision 
allows a person to formulate one’s belief and desire; could 
produce a variety of results and be interpreted in the framework 
of several cognitive schemata, and a reason for a decision is 
situated within a particular framework; an understanding of the 
relevance of the decision to other knowledge.  Decisions in which 
there are few potential reasons for making a particular choice are 
likely to be more difficult.  The context in which options are 
situated can add or remove context-dependent reasons for choice, 
making the decision easier or more difficult (Anderson, 2003). 
 
Making a decision clarifies one’s particular desires and beliefs.  However, not 
having a reason may lead to indecisiveness.  For example, a decision maker has three 
options, but cannot find a consequentialist reason to choose one option over the other.  
Not being able to differentiate the choices indicates that the decision maker has 
inadequate logic to choose one option over the other.  If the decision maker cannot 
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differentiate the choices, he/she will not have a good reason to choose.  The extent to 
which an individual cannot develop an accepted reason for choice may cause a state of 
indecisiveness in the decision maker.  
For example, a manager has many indistinguishable options and the uncertainty 
and consequences are high.  The manager may feel that he or she is missing something, 
or lacks the ability to make a decision because he or she cannot differentiate.  If there is 
enough uncertainty and risk, and the manager cannot distinctly find a clear superior 
choice, the manager may feel stuck in the decision-making process and have high levels 
of negative concurrent emotions.  The manager does not know what to do; the issues 
seem overwhelming due to the amount of risk of a choice and the pressure on the 
manager to change.  A manager's inability to find a clear superior choice may lead to a 
state of indecision.    
  
Hypothesis 6: Incomparable alternatives are positively related  
                  to indecisiveness. 
 
Summary  
I propose three factors that lead to difficult decisions and hypothesized that each 
component is independently positively related to indecisiveness.  Further, the component 
of selection difficulty is comprised of three sub-components: incomparable alternatives, 
preference uncertainty, and poorly structured decisions.  This logic is based on the 
definition of indecisiveness, which is defined as high levels of negative concurrent 
emotions and feeling stuck in the decision-making process.  Five hypotheses were 
developed with regard to the components and sub-components, suggesting that each is 
positively correlated with indecisiveness.  In sum, I hypothesize that the combination of 
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experienced negative emotions and being unable to decide will “imprison” the decision 
maker and make him or her want to escape from this current state. 
Decisional Self-Efficacy 
Low decisional self-efficacy may influence levels of indecisiveness.  Self-
efficacy can be defined as an individual’s estimation of his/her capacity to orchestrate 
performance on a specific task (Gist & Mitchell, 1992).  Gist and Mitchell (1992) looked 
specifically at decisional self-efficacy, which occurs when the decision maker focuses 
on his or her perceived ability to make a decision that is beneficial and meets certain 
objectives and  goals.  
           Gist and Mitchell (1992) demonstrated that decisional self-efficacy affects one’s 
effort, persistence, and belief in attaining certain goals (Gist & Mitchell, 1992).  
Individuals are motivated to act only if they perceive they can bridge the discrepancy 
between goals and performance (Westen, 1985).  Based on work done by Westen 
(1985), I hypothesize that if the decision maker perceives that they are incapable of 
making a decision, they will be more likely to fall into a state of indecisiveness.  Recall 
that whether or not one becomes indecisive is based on the three factors of difficult 
decisions that were previously discussed.  However, I believe that perceptions of one’s 
ability to make decisions have a strong influence on the relationship between difficult 
decisions and indecisiveness (see Figure 2).  
           Literature in counseling psychology shows strong evidence that decision-making 
efficacy and outcome expectations relate to career indecision (Betz, Klein, & Taylor, 
1996).  Moreover, this study indicated that self-efficacy beliefs were the best predictor of 
career indecision, and outcome expectations were the best predictor of exploration 
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intentions (Betz et al., 1996).  Individuals evaluate their own resources and capabilities 
for dealing with stressors.  Coping responses depend on how individuals construe their 
ability to respond; if they believe they have adequate resources to deal with this new 
event, they are likely to respond more actively.   
       An examination of self-efficacy appraisals on coping behaviors (Terry, 1991; 1994) 
suggests that after controlling for self-esteem and generalized control beliefs, “self-
efficacy appraisals were positively related to the use of instrumental behaviors and 
negatively related to the use of escapism/self-blame strategies” (Blais, 2001).  Evidence 
to support this notion shows that self-efficacy beliefs were the best predictor of career 
indecision (Betz & Voyten, 1997).  Therefore, I hypothesize that self-efficacy moderates 
the relationship between indecisiveness and each of the components of a difficult 
decision. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The relationship between preference instability  
                  and indecisiveness is moderated by decisional    
                  self-efficacy. 
 
Hypothesis 8: The relationship between anticipated regret and  
                  indecisiveness is moderated by decisional self- 
                  efficacy. 
 
Hypothesis 9: The relationship between preference uncertainty  
             and indecisiveness is moderated by decisional  
                  self-efficacy. 
 
Hypothesis 10: The relationship between poorly structured  
                    decisions and indecisiveness is moderated by  
                    decisional self-efficacy. 
 
Hypothesis 11: The relationship between incomparable  
                    alternatives and indecisiveness is moderated  
                    by decisional self-efficacy. 
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 In each case (i.e., hypothesis 7-11) the relationship between the components of 
difficult decisions and the level of indecisiveness will be stronger when the decision 
maker’s self-efficacy is weaker. 
The Role of Indecisiveness in the Decision Making Process 
Making a difficult decision can be an emotional process that leads to stress, 
anxiety, and fear.  By acknowledging the emotional component of decision-making, we 
can see how negative concurrent emotions may reach an unmanageable level, thereby 
causing the decision maker to focus his attention on coping with the emotions rather than 
the choices and consequences of the decision.  Indeed, Lazarus and Folkman (1984), 
Janis and Mann (1977), and Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggest that emotions play a vital 
role in the decision-making process.   
Being undecided-uncomfortable (the basic definition of indecisiveness) is 
extremely difficult to deal with, and as such, individuals attempt to escape from its 
mental and emotional paralysis.  Therefore, I argue that individuals do not use coping 
behavior because of the difficulty of the decision, but because difficult decisions lead to 
indecisiveness, which is a very difficult state to tolerate.  As stated earlier, this means the 
actual act of making a decision functions as a coping behavior in and of itself.  Hence, 
decision makers may resort to a form of nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional 
coping behavior due to the indecisiveness state.  This is different from dysfunctional 
decisional coping behavior, which solely is explained by cognitive and consequential 
evaluations.  Please see Figure 2 for the graphic representation of the NDMM model.  
From the literature review, there are two basic assumptions that are made with 
regard to making difficult decisions:  (1), a difficult decision can lead to a heightened 
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state of stress, and (2), difficult decisions lead to some form of dysfunctional coping 
behavior.  These two fundamental assumptions have strong influences on each other 
because being in a heightened state of stress is a strong antecedent to most general (e.g., 
not decision specific coping behavior) coping behaviors.  Further, not resolving issues 
and reverting to dysfunctional coping behaviors may sustain and draw out a stressful 
state.  Therefore, the two underlying assumptions are strongly linked.  As noted earlier, 
indecisiveness is the decision maker’s decisional prison, which I argue mediates the 
relationship between the difficult decision and dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.  
Within this decisional prison, there is a heightened level of stress due to the inability to 
make a decision.  Therefore, the assumption of a heightened level of stress may be 
linked to falling into a state of indecisiveness.  
Current literature in decision-making suggests a direct link between difficult 
decisions and dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.  However, this does not explain 
why a decision maker would need to escape from a difficult decision.  It seems more 
likely that the decision maker will escape from his or her inability to make a decision as 
opposed to the decision itself.  A decision maker who faces a difficult decision can 
attempt to follow through on a vigilant/problem focused path regardless of the intensity 
of concurrent emotions.  This individual may become overwhelmed by being undecided-
uncomfortable and fall into long term decisional paralysis, or become overwhelmed and 
escape from the decision-making process.  Of these choices, there is no direct link 
between difficult decisions and nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping 
behaviors leading us to the hypothesis that indecisiveness mediates the relationship 
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between difficult decisions and nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping 
behaviors.        
Hypothesis 12: The relationship between difficult decisions and  
 nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping  
behaviors is mediated by indecisiveness. 
 
 
Summary 
I first discussed appraisals (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), which activate coping 
behaviors.  I then discussed the three dominant dysfunctional decisional coping behavior 
models: emotion-focused coping, defensive avoidance, and decision avoidance.  Lastly, I 
discussed how all three models suggest that difficult decisions lead to dysfunctional 
decisional coping behavior.  This establishes that the literature suggests the notion that 
difficult decisions directly lead to or cause dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.  
However, I hypothesize that indecisiveness does play a critical role in the relationship 
between dysfunctional decisional coping behavior and decision-making.  
I have suggested that indecisiveness leads to nonconsequentialist dysfunctional 
decisional coping behavior, and that individuals may make decisions to alleviate 
negative concurrent emotions created by the decision.  Much work has been done on the 
conceptual side showing how decisions can be conflict ridden.  From this line of 
research, very few empirical studies have attempted to measure the relationship between 
decision-making and dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.  Therefore, I developed 
the construct of indecisiveness and explained its role in the decision-making process.  I 
argue that the relationship between difficult decisions and nonconsequentialist 
dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors is mediated by indecisiveness. 
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CHAPTER IV                                                                         
METHODS 
Sample  
Exactly 578 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory to advanced 
business and psychology courses at Texas A&M University participated in this study.  
The aim of the study is to examine indecisiveness, therefore only those participants who 
stated that they felt indecisive completed the indecisiveness scale, allowing for a final 
data set of 465.   
Those students who participated were compensated through extra credit for the 
course they were taking, and had a chance to win one of four $50 prizes.  The sample 
consisted of 51% female and 49% male participants.  The participants’ age ranged from 
18-29 with an average age of 21.46.   
The sample was selected for various reasons.  This study aims to understand 
human decision-making and attempts to capture a wide range of critical decisions 
individuals must face.  Advanced level college students approaching graduation are a 
suitable sample of individuals facing many changes and crucial decisions.  Due to the 
basic nature of the questions I am attempting to answer, it is not necessary to focus on 
individual decision-making in a specific organization.  However, future research may 
benefit from studying nonconsequentialist decision-making in an organizational context 
or using a specific sample group (e.g., business executives). 
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Design and Procedure 
This study attempts to move beyond the limitations of scenarios and controlled 
experiments within the decision-making literature, and attempts to understand real 
decisions that are important to real people.  A unique methodology was utilized to assess 
how emotions affect decision-making and to test the mediation of indecisiveness 
between difficult decisions and dysfunctional decisional coping behavior.  In general, it 
is beneficial to study decision-making in a natural setting.  However, much work in the 
judgment and decision-making field uses simulations and scenarios, where subjects play 
out roles or pretend to be in hypothetical situations.  Unfortunately, this methodological 
design cannot capture genuine emotions that occur during the decision-making process, 
perhaps due to the lack of personal relevance to the participant.  Therefore, I examined 
decision-making in a naturalistic setting using the participants’ own decision.  Subjects 
where asked to write in paragraph format the “biggest” decision they were currently 
facing in their life and to complete a battery of questionnaires with regard to their “big” 
decision.  Due to participants’ strong emotional investment in the experiment, this 
unique methodological design has allowed me to better assess emotions experienced 
during the decision-making process.   
Data analyzed in this study was collected at one time period in a designated 
computer lab on campus.  The study was conducted using a software program that 
provided detailed instructions guiding the participants through the questionnaires.  I was 
also present at the lab at all times to help students with any questions.  The software 
program encoded time, date, and all other aspects of each participant throughout the 
study.  Participants came to a large computer lab (150 computers) once a week on the 
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same day of the week for four weeks.  The computer lab was reserved for eight hours a 
day three days (Tuesday-Thursday) a week during June 3rd and July 2nd 2003.  In week 
one, participants created a unique login name and password.  This allowed me to limit 
and track each participant over the four weeks, and to ensure the integrity of the study.  
Each subsequent week (time 2-4) participants came to the lab and logged in using their 
unique login name and password, and were immediately able to review their description 
of the biggest decision they are currently facing in their lives.   
Due to the nature of the software program, participants were not allowed to 
continue to the next series of questions without completing all the questions on their 
current page.  This nearly guaranteed that all participants completed every question, 
therefore, no action was needed with regard to missing values. 
At Time 1, after creating their login and password, participants filled out 
demographic data.  Participants were immediately asked to write approximately two 
paragraphs (15-20 minutes) about their big decision, components of the decision, and the 
alternatives in detail.  Excitingly, students appeared eager to write about their decision 
and on average wrote approximately 630 words, taking 30-60 minutes.  The students 
seemed intrinsically motivated to talk about their decision and appeared to take a great 
deal of care writing and answering the questions.  After participants wrote paragraphs 
about their big decision, they were asked if they felt indecisive about their decision.  The 
software program guided participants through the survey, and only individuals who 
stated they felt indecisive about their decision completed the indecisiveness scale (see 
Figure 7).  Of the 578 who participated, 465 stated they felt indecisive about their “big” 
decision.   
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With regard to their “big” decision, participants completed five questionnaires on 
week 1: the Three Factor Difficult Decisions Questionnaire (TFDDQ); the 
Indecisiveness Scale, the Nonconsequentialist Dysfunctional Decisional Coping 
Behavior Scale (NDDCBS); the Decisional Self-Efficacy Scale, and the Analytic-
Emotion Decision-Making Questionnaire.  On a weekly basis (weeks 2-4) participants 
were re-administered the Three Factor Difficult Decisions Questionnaire (TFDDQ); the 
Indecisiveness Scale, the Nonconsequentialist Dysfunctional Decisional Coping 
Behavior Scale (NDDCBS); and Decisional Self-Efficacy Scale, among other scales.  
However, the current analyses will focus solely on data collected in week 1 (Note: only 
those individuals who felt indecisive were asked to complete the Three Factor Difficult 
Decisions Questionnaire (TFDDQ), the Indecisiveness Scale, and the 
Nonconsequentialist Dysfunctional Decisional Coping Behavior Scale (NDDCBS)).  All 
of these measures will be described in more detail below. 
Measures 
Indecisiveness Scale 
The development  of the Indecisiveness Scale is based on the theory development 
section of this study, which is based on Loewenstein et al. (2001), Jones (1989); 
Lamprell (1989), and Zeelenberg and colleagues’ ( Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg & 
Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, Van Der Plight, & De Vries, 1996) work on 
concurrent emotions during the decision-making process. 
The Indecisiveness Scale is a 13-item measure (see Scale A) assessing one’s 
indecisiveness towards a particular decision.  Participants give their ratings on a six-
point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”  The 
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questionnaire’s instructions are: “Please answer the following questions based on the 
biggest decision you are currently facing in your life.”  The item scores are summed to 
produce an overall Indecisiveness Scale score with a maximum score of 78.  Using the 
Indecisiveness Scale in the current study resulted in a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.919 for the 
sample.  An exploratory factor analysis of the Indecisiveness Scale was conducted in 
which factors were extracted using iterated principle factors and were rotated obliquely.  
Several traditional criteria for determining the number of factors supported a one-factor 
solution.  Inspection of the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix of the 13 variables 
revealed only one eigenvalue greater than 1.00.  This one-factor had an eigenvalue of 
6.7, and explains more than 51% of the variance (see Table 1).  Inspection of the loading 
matrix associated with the one-factor solution indicated an approximation of a simple 
structure (each item loaded highly on only one factor with no evidence of substantial 
cross loading).  Eigenvalues for factors 2-13 were all below 1.00.  Examination of a 
scree plot of the data indicated a sharp break after the first factor, visually similar to an 
“elbow,” suggesting the presence of one underlying factor (see Table 1).  Scree Plot 
results in conjunction with the eigenvalue suggest that the Indecisiveness Scale is 
measuring one construct.       
Decision-Making Strategy Scale 
To assess convergent and divergent validity of the indecisiveness construct, I 
used an adapted version of the Decision-Making Style Inventory (DMSI; Nygren, 2000).  
The DMSI attempts to categorize multiple normative and descriptive decision-making 
strategies.  Though the scale in its original form speaks to how an individual makes 
decisions in general, I adapted the scale to reflect the strategy the decision maker is 
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using on their current “big” decision.  The Decision-Making Strategy Scale contains two 
subscales, one reflecting logical strategies (e.g., I have defined what I want based on 
logic and will make a decision that will maximize what I want), and one reflecting 
emotional strategies (e.g., in the end I will rely on my gut feeling to make my final 
decision) (see Scale 2).   
The logical portion of the Decision-Making Strategy Scale is a 7-item 
questionnaire using a six-point Likert scale.  The questionnaire measures whether the 
decision maker is using a logical strategy to make a decision.  The questionnaire’s 
instructions and ratings mirror that of the Indecisiveness Scale.  The item scores are 
summed to produce an overall score with a maximum score of 42.  For the sample of 
578 participants, the Logical Strategy subscale has a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.75. 
The Emotional subcategory of the Decision-Making Strategy Scale has 11 items 
and uses a six-point Likert scale.  Similar to the Logical portion of this questionnaire, the 
items assess whether the decision maker is using an emotional strategy to make a 
decision.  Item scores are summed, which results in an overall score of 66.  For the 
sample of 578 participants, the Emotional Strategy subscale has a Cronbach’s Alpha of 
0.79. 
The Logical and Emotional Strategy subscales showed a negative correlation 
with each other (r = -.133, p<.002) using a 2-tailed Pearson correlation.  For convergent 
validity, indecisiveness would be correlated positively with a decision strategy based on 
emotions.  Accordingly, the correlation between indecisiveness and an emotional 
decision strategy is positive, (r = .085, p<.042) using a 2-tailed Pearson correlation, 
suggesting that there is some convergent validity within the construct.  For divergent 
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validity to occur, the decision maker who is indecisive would most likely not take on a 
logical decisional strategy.  The correlation between indecisiveness and having a logical 
decisional strategy is nonsignificant (r = .044, p<.297) using a 2-tailed Pearson 
correlation.  There seems to be no significant negative correlation limiting the idea of 
divergent validity.   
Nonconsequentialist Dysfunctional Decisional Coping Behavior Scale  
The Nonconsequentialist Dysfunctional Decisional Coping Behavior Scale 
(NDDCBS) was developed based largely on the theory development part of this paper, 
and work by Loewenstein et al. (2001).  The NDDCBS is a 6-item questionnaire using a 
six-point Likert scale (see Scale 3).  The questionnaire measures how one copes with 
concurrent emotions experienced during decision-making.  The questionnaire’s 
instructions and ratings mirror that of the Indecisiveness Scale.  The item scores are 
summed to produce an overall NDDCBS score with a maximum score of 36.  For the 
sample of 465 participants, the NDDCBS has a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.82. 
An exploratory factor analysis of the NDDCBS suggests a one-factor scale.  With 
and eigenvalue of 3.2, and the one factor explaining more than 53% of the variance (see 
Table 2).  Eigenvalues for factors 2-6 were all below 1.00.  A scree plot gives a visual 
display similar to an “elbow,” (see Table 2) suggesting one factor.  Therefore, both the 
scree plot and eigenvalues suggest that the NDDCBS is measuring one construct. 
Three Factor Difficult Decision Questionnaire 
The Three Factor Difficult Decision Questionnaire (TFDDQ) is based on the 
theory development section of this paper which in large part is based on Anderson’s 
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(2003) work on avoidance, and Janis and Mann’s (1977) work on conflict and decision-
making.  The TFDDQ is an 11-item scale measuring the overall difficulty of the 
decision.  Participants give their ratings on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.  The questionnaire’s instructions are: “Please 
answer the following 11 questions based on this statement- My indecisiveness over my 
big decision has been due to….” followed by the 11 items and Likert scale (see Scale 4).   
The TFDDQ is composed of five subscales; anticipated regret, preference 
instability, incomparable alternatives, ill structured decisions, and preference 
uncertainty.  Each subscale score is aggregated by summing individual subscale items.  
The five subscales are summed to produce an overall TFDDQ score with a maximum 
score of 66.  Using the TFDDQ in the current study resulted in a Cronbach’s Alpha of 
0.827 from the sample of 465 participants. 
Individually the components that make up a difficult decision had the following 
scale reliabilities: anticipated regret Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.87, preference instability 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.790, incomparable alternatives Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.799 , ill 
structured decision Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.768, and lastly preference uncertainty 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.727.   
An exploratory factor analysis of the TFDDQ resulted in a one-factor scale.  
With an eigenvalue of 4.4, and the one factor explaining 37% of the variance (see Scale 
5).  Eigenvalues for factors 2-11 were all below 2.00.  A visual display of the factor 
analysis displays a scree plot similar to an “elbow” and in combination with the 
eigenvalue gives good credence that the TFDDQ is measuring one construct (see Table 
3).  Though there are four factors that have eigenvalues above 1.00, this is not surprising.  
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This measure is a multifaceted construct, and the complexity of the construct is reflected 
in this factor analysis.  However, in general the factor loading and explained variance 
suggests one factor.  Multifaceted and complex constructs such as difficult decisions will 
not have as clear of a distinction as other scales in this study, but the factor loading still 
strongly indicates a one factor model.   
Decisional Self Efficacy Scale 
Regardless of whether participants were indecisive or not, all participants 
completed the Decisional Self-Efficacy Scale (see Scale 5), which is composed of the 
Self-Efficacy Scale (Blais, 2001) and items from the Career Decision-Making Self-
Efficacy Scale (CDMSE; Taylor & Betz,(1983).  Both scales were chosen because they 
assess the decision maker’s belief that he or she is able to accomplish the tasks needed to 
make a successful decision.  Blais’ Self-efficacy Scale is a 6-item scale based on work 
by Bandura (1977) on efficacy expectations and Lazarus and Folkman (1984) work on 
secondary appraisals.  As noted by Blais (2001), existing scales do not capture one’s 
decisional beliefs but focus largely on non-decisional behaviors. 
The six items of Blais’ Self-Efficacy Scale were combined with four items from 
the self-appraisal subscale of the CDMSE to create the 10-item Decisional Self-Efficacy 
Scale used in this study.  The original CDMSE is vocationally based, therefore wording 
for the four items were adapted slightly to accommodate the general decision-making 
focus of the current study. 
The Decisional Self-Efficacy Scale developed for this study uses a 6-point Likert 
scale, with a range of “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” to specify one’s 
perceived efficacy in successfully making a good decision.  Using the Decisional Self-
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Efficacy Scale in the current study resulted in a consistency estimate (alpha coefficient) 
of 0.891 for the sample. 
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CHAPTER V                                                                         
RESULTS 
Introduction 
The current analyses were performed solely on data collected at week 1.  
Correlations for the self-report measures (N= 465), means, standard deviations, and 
consistency estimates (alpha coefficient) for the measures can be found in Table 4.  
Hypotheses 2-6 examine the relationship between the Three Factor Model of Difficult 
Decisions and indecisiveness (see Table 5 and 6).  Hypotheses 7-11 ask if decisional 
self-efficacy plays a moderating role between the Three Factor Model of Difficult 
Decisions and indecisiveness (see Table 5). 
The Relationship Between Indecisiveness and Coping Behavior  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that indecisiveness is positively related to dysfunctional 
decisional coping behaviors.  There seems to be a strong significant positive association 
between indecisiveness and dysfunctional decisional coping behavior (r = .581, 
p<.0001).  Regressing indecisiveness on dysfunctional decisional coping behavior using 
OLS showed an r2 =.337, F=235.75, p=.0001 (see Table 6).    
Antecedents of Indecisiveness  
Hypotheses 2-6 predict that the components of the Three Factors of Difficult 
Decisions (TFDD) are positively related to indecisiveness.  Statistically significant 
positive correlations for the main effects of the hypothesized antecedents of 
indecisiveness were found (see Table 6).  However, I conducted further analyses with all 
components of the TFDD scale centered and included in one model, resulting in 
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variables of the TFDD no longer being significant except for anticipated regret (see 
Model 1 in Table 5).  The anticipated regret variable showed a significant positive 
association with indecisiveness (t= 2.08<.05) controlling for the centered variables: 
preference instability, preference uncertainty, poor structure, and incomparable 
alternatives.  All other variables in Model 1 (see Table 5; Hypothesis 3-6) were not 
significant.   
Moderating Effect of Decisional Self-Efficacy  
Hypotheses 7-11, which posit that decisional self-efficacy moderates the 
relationship between the Three Factors of Difficult Decisions and indecisiveness, 
showed no significant results.  When testing for moderation, one must be concerned with 
multicollinearity, due to the interaction terms being used.  To alleviate the concerns of 
multicollinearity, Aiken and West (1991) suggest that all independent continuous 
variables be centered.  Centering was accomplished by standardizing each scale and 
subtracting each standardized score with the mean of the standardized scale.  For 
Hypotheses 7-11, no moderating effects were shown (see table 5). 
Mediation of the Nonconsequentialist Decision-Making Model  
Hypothesis 12 predicts that difficult decisions and dysfunctional decisional 
coping behavior is mediated by indecisiveness.  To test for mediation, Baron and Kenny 
(1986) state four conditions must be met.  The first condition is that the independent 
variable must affect the mediator in a regression equation.  Second, the independent 
variable must be shown to affect the dependent variable in a regression equation.  Third, 
the mediator must affect the dependent variable.  Lastly, the effect of the independent 
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variable on the dependent variable must be less on the third equation than in the second 
equation, with full mediation occurring when the independent variable has no effect 
when the mediator is controlled. 
In Hypothesis 12, the Three Factor Model of Difficult Decisions is the 
independent variable, dysfunctional decisional coping behavior is the dependent 
variable, and indecisiveness is the predicted mediator.  To satisfy condition 1 (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986), I regressed indecisiveness on difficult decisions and found a significant 
effect, F=10.17, p=.002 (see table 6).  Second, I regressed dysfunctional decisional 
coping behavior on difficult decisions and found a significant effect, F= 4.573, p=.033.  
Lastly, I regressed dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors on both difficult decisions 
and the indecisiveness scales.  The model showed indecisiveness with a beta of .579, t = 
15.120, p<.0001, and difficult decisions with a beta of .014, t = .366, p< .714.  Indeed, 
the Three Factors of Difficult Decisions has no effect when indecisiveness is controlled, 
resulting in a full mediation, supporting Hypothesis 12.   
Results found in hypotheses 2-6 (i.e., Model 1 in Table 5) indicated no 
significant relationship for four components of the TFDD when controlling for 
anticipated regret.  Further analyses were conducted to test the mediation of 
indecisiveness between anticipated regret and nonconsequentialist dysfunctional 
decisional coping behavior.  As mentioned above (Baron & Kenny, 1986), in the first 
step to test mediation I regressed indecisiveness on anticipated regret F=9.68, p=.002.  
Second, I regressed dysfunctional decisional coping behavior on anticipated regret, F= 
4.070, p=.044, and lastly, I regressed dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors on both 
anticipated regret and the indecisiveness scales.  The model showed indecisiveness with 
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a beta of .579, t = 15.142, p<.000, and anticipated regret with a beta of .010, t = .273, p< 
.785, indicating full mediation.  
According to Holland (1988) and Sobel (1990) mediation implies a causal 
relationship were the independent variable causes a mediator which causes a dependent 
variable.  Hence, the results of Hypothesis 12 implies a causal sequence, such that 
difficult decisions to some extent causes indecisiveness, and that indecisiveness to some 
extent causes nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping behaviors.  The 
supported full mediation also clarifies our understanding of the direction of hypotheses 
1-6.  Hypotheses 1-6 did not imply direction or causality, however, the full mediation 
has clarified and affirmed the Nonconsequentialist Decision-Making Model.    
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CHAPTER VI                                                                        
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Traditionally, the judgment and decision-making literature has interpreted 
decision-making as rational or irrational, with an attempt to understand and negate 
common flaws in logic.  However, this study supports a nonconsequentialist perspective, 
suggesting that emotions play a significant role in the decision-making process.  By 
including emotions in the decision-making process, we can move beyond the sole focus 
of rational-irrational and attempt to also deal with people’s emotions during the 
decision-making process to help them make the best decisions for themselves and others. 
By utilizing a standard methodological design, the current study attempts to 
better understand how individuals make important, real decisions in their own lives.  
Participants were asked to discuss the biggest decision they are currently facing in their 
life.  This approach elicited a wide range of decisions from participants, allowing me to 
discover what is important to the decision maker, and in a natural way find out how 
emotions play an integral part in the decision-making process.  Perhaps the most 
interesting outcome of this methodology is that of the 578 total participants who 
completed the study, 465 stated that they felt indecisive!  In other words, approximately 
81% of the participants felt indecisive about their “big” decision.   
As noted earlier, research studying indecisiveness is sparse at best, and the need 
to study the construct has been consistently overlooked in the literature.  Researchers 
may be hesitant to study indecisiveness because the phenomenon is thought to be rare, 
and does not speak to the general reality of the decision-making process.  However, this 
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study indicates that the presumed anomaly may exist more often than the literature 
reflects, with only one caveat – the decision must be important to the decision maker for 
indecisiveness to occur.          
Additionally, nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping behavior 
(NDDCB) is a recently developed topic that has yet to be further validated empirically.  
The current results indicate that NDDCB is positively related to indecisiveness, 
suggesting that individuals do not like to stay in the decision-making process when they 
have negative concurrent emotions, and consequently, may make a decision to cope with 
the emotions the decision has created.  While much conceptual work has argued that 
individuals make nonconsequentialist decisions, little empirical evidence has supported 
such a notion.  This study shows that decision makers do indeed make 
nonconsequentialist decisions.  Loewenstein et al. (2001) notes that: “Virtually all 
current theories in decision-making under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and 
consequentialist.”   They use the word consequentialist in its general sense to describe 
how individuals make decisions based on the probability of the consequences of each 
choice.  The consequentialist perspective is represented by expected utility theory (i.e., a 
prescriptive theory where utility = value, and individuals act rationally).  If Loewenstein 
et al.’s (2001) previous quote is accurate, then results of the current study go against 
virtually all theories in the judgment and decision-making literature.  Moreover, this 
significant relationship between indecisiveness and nonconsequentialist dysfunctional 
decisional coping behavior suggests that decision makers commonly use NDDCB when 
in a state of indecisiveness.  Dysfunctional decisional coping behavior is not an anomaly 
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in the decision-making universe, but a common occurrence when one speaks of difficult 
decisions and indecisiveness.   
Understanding the decision-making process is complex, and many individual and 
environmental variables play critical roles that lead the decision maker to a particular 
choice.  Many participants in this study in the midst of their decision stated they would 
rather make a harmful or bad decision than no decision at all, and that they were not 
focused on the consequences of the decision but the emotions the decision created.  
Consequently, these individuals also endorsed that they were in a state of indecisiveness.   
The equivocal results in the literature looking at the relationship between difficult 
decisions and dysfunctional decisional coping behavior may be due to the confounding 
of indecisiveness and the inadequate measurement of the difficult decision construct.  
The ability to measure the difficult decision construct accurately is critical to our ability 
to understand the decision-making process.  This study theoretically developed Three 
Factors of Difficult Decisions (TFDD) based on work in critical decision-making and 
decisional avoidance.  From the theoretical framework of the TFDD, the TFDD 
Questionnaire was developed and found to have solid psychometric properties.  
However, when anticipated regret was controlled for, the other components of the TFDD 
no longer were significant.  Therefore, four of the five variables that comprise the TFDD 
failed to maintain a significant relationship when controlling for the other variables in 
the model (see Model 1 in Table 5).  Anticipated regret still maintained a significant 
relationship when controlling for the other variables in the TFDD.  This aligns well with 
Loewenstein and colleagues’ (2001) original nonconsequentialist model of decision-
making (see Figure 5).  Loewenstein et al., (2001) conceptually argued that the vividness 
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and immediacy of the anticipated emotions would lead to anticipatory emotions (i.e., 
concurrent emotions), thus resulting in emotions affecting the decision-making process.  
Indecisiveness is largely defined as negative concurrent emotions (i.e., anticipatory 
emotions).  Support for Hypothesis 12 (mediation) suggests a causal link between 
anticipated regret and indecisiveness, giving some empirical validation to Loewenstein 
et al’s., (2001) nonconsequentialist model (Figure 5).     
However, the current study does not support work by Anderson (2003) and Janis 
and Mann (1977) regarding antecedents to concurrent emotions and dysfunctional 
decisional coping behavior.  Variables such as preference uncertainty, incomparable 
alternatives, and poor structure were not significant when controlling for anticipated 
regret.        
The TFDDQ and the measurement of anticipated regret is an important step in 
accurately measuring difficult decisions and its relationship to dysfunctional decisional 
coping behavior.  Moreover, the TFDDQ and its anticipated regret component showed a 
significant positive relationship with indecisiveness.  Showing a positive significant 
relationship between difficult decisions and indecisiveness, coupled with the full 
mediation effect, suggests that negative concurrent emotions may occur due to difficult 
decisions.      
However, the tests of the moderating effect of decisional self-efficacy between 
the five components of difficult decisions and indecisiveness (Hypotheses 7-11) showed 
no significant results.  On a positive note, the findings suggest that no aspect of the 
Three Factors of Difficult Decisions is perceived and reacted to differently in the 
decision-making process.  There may have been greater concern if some of the 
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components of the TFDD were moderated and others were not.  One possible 
explanation for the lack of a moderating effect may lie in the cognitive nature of 
decisional self-efficacy.  Cognitively, an individual may believe that they can 
accomplish a successful decision.  However, if a difficult decision triggers an 
overwhelming emotional rush, one’s cognitive belief that they can make a successful 
decision is secondary to what is immediately happening to the decision maker.  Even 
though cognitively we believe that we can and should make a constructive decision, our 
emotions get the best of us, and we let our irrational fears consume us and we fall into a 
state of indecisiveness.  Therefore, emotions overriding cognitions may explain a lack of 
a moderating effect.      
Furthermore, the current study aided in the theoretical development of the 
indecisiveness construct, creating a definition of indecisiveness that reflects current 
research in judgment and decision-making, and separating indecisiveness from other 
constructs in the field.  The positive psychometric properties of the Indecisiveness Scale 
and the display of convergent validity bode well for the measurement instrument.  The 
theoretical development of the role of indecisiveness in the decision-making process and 
the subsequent empirical evidence supporting the full mediation are important 
contributions to the judgment and decision-making literature.   
This research appears to offer a new model in decision-making, which strays 
from the consequentialist paradigm.  However, the consequentialist perspective should 
be viewed as a strong complimentary perspective to the Nonconsequentialist Decision-
Making Model.  The consequentialist perspective occurs commonly, and represents most 
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decisions where individuals can functionally cope with the emotions the decision-
making process creates.   
Limitations and Future Research 
The current study employed a unique methodology to study decision-making and 
indecisiveness, however, there are limitations to this approach.  One limitation of the 
study concerns common source and common method bias.  All data were collected from 
one source, Texas A&M undergraduates, and one methodology, self-report 
questionnaires.  Though the nature of most of the constructs (specifically indecisiveness, 
decisional self-efficacy, and nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping 
behavior) necessitates self-report data, future research should explore the magnitude of 
this potential common source bias by using structural equation modeling to control for 
common source.   
While the consequentialist and nonconsequentialist perspectives were compared 
and contrasted from a theoretical sense.  This study did not contrast the two perspectives 
empirically.  The current research supports the nonconsequentialist perspective; 
however, I did not simultaneously test the two opposing models in this study.  Future 
work should model both the consequentialist and nonconsequentialist perspectives in 
one study to shed light on the context and validity of each.    
Another issue is that participants self-selected themselves as indecisive.  The 
participants’ response to this yes/no question is the sole selection criteria, and thus 
individuals who are not truly indecisive may have answered the indecisiveness 
questionnaire.  Future research may use alternative methodology, for example a Likert 
scale, to measure the degree of indecisiveness.   
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Furthermore, the correlation and regression analysis of cross-sectional data 
qualifies any causal inferences.  Future research could examine these same relationships 
in a more controlled setting such as an experimental laboratory or with longitudinal data 
to assess causality.  Lastly, the sample is also limiting from a management perspective.  
To understand managerial decision-making, subsequent work should use a sample of 
managers in multiple industries and levels of management.   
Given the limitations of the current study, there is much to be gained from future 
research on the topic of indecisiveness and nonconsequentialist decision-making.  For 
example, the causal link between indecisiveness and decisional coping behavior needs to 
be better understood.  Kline (1998) suggests, among other requirements, that to infer that 
indecisiveness causes decisional coping behavior, indecisiveness must precede 
decisional coping behavior.  As noted earlier, only data from Time 1 was used for the 
present analyses – the total study took place over the course of four weeks.  Therefore, 
the complete data set can be analyzed to explore the longitudinal components and 
subsequent causal nature of dysfunctional decisional coping behavior more thoroughly.    
The longitudinal data set can also help us to better understand (1) why an 
individual commits to a choice and (2) their post-decision reactions and perceptions.  
Each week participants were asked if they had made a final decision.  Over two-thirds of 
the participants who initially felt indecisive made a decision over the course of the one-
month study.  When participants indicated that they made a final decision, additional 
measures were administered that assessed the key cognitive and emotional factors that 
led to the final choice and post-decisional reactions and behaviors.  Future analyses will 
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expand on this study’s understanding of the decision-making process by exploring 
choice and post-decisional behavior.  
 Not only has the quantitative data been rich and informative, but a significant 
amount of qualitative data was collected with the current study.  Each week participants 
were asked to write about key components of the decision-making process.  This 
qualitative data may further the theoretical development of nonconsequentialist decision-
making, further validate the construct of indecisiveness, and confirm the conclusions of 
this study.   
The results from this research suggest that indecisiveness plays an important role 
in the decision-making process.  Moreover, this research supports the 
nonconsequentialist decision-making perspective, and more importantly develops and 
supports a model that shows how individuals make nonconsequentialist decisions.   
Though these “big” decisions and the nonconsequentialist perspective may speak to 
some of the most critical and important decisions in one’s life, they do not speak to a 
majority of daily decisions.  Many decisions are not “the biggest decision I am currently 
facing in my life” and do not define one’s identity and purpose.  Regardless, big 
decisions are often the most difficult to face and carry the most critical outcomes, further 
underscoring the need for research in this area.    
Conclusions 
  The measurement and development of the current model, Nonconsequentialist 
Decision-Making Model, looks at decision-making from a nonconsequentialist 
perspective using a natural decision-making methodology.  The findings show that 
difficult decisions do lead to indecisiveness, and the indecisiveness state does affect the 
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decision-making process.  These results suggest that decision makers who fall into a 
state of indecisiveness are willing to sacrifice a decision based on consequences and 
logic to escape one’s negative emotions during the decision-making process.  
The judgment and decision-making literature has primarily viewed decision-
making from a consequentialist perspective - solely looking at cognitive evaluations of 
subjective probabilities and anticipated outcomes, and viewing emotions as 
epiphenomenal.  However, new conceptual work in the field has suggested a 
nonconsequentialist perspective to decision-making (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  The 
nonconsequentialist perspective discusses the importance of concurrent emotions during 
the decision-making process, and addresses how these concurrent emotions may lead to 
decisions that are nonconsequentialist in nature.  The results of this study support the 
NDMM model and the nonconsequentialist perspective.  Positive results for the NDMM 
give empirical support to recent work on nonconsequentialist decision-making and the 
importance of concurrent emotions in the decision-making process.  
In the current study the indecisiveness construct was successfully measured, and 
more than half of the participants felt indecisive during the decision-making process.  
Being indecisive is a product of negative concurrent emotions while being stuck in the 
decision-making process.  Indecisiveness was shown to mediate the relationship between 
difficult decisions and nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping behavior, 
allowing indecisiveness to be discussed as playing a central role in our understanding of 
negative concurrent emotions and nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping 
behaviors.  While the current research contributes much to the field in terms of the 
indecisiveness construct and testing the nonconsequentialist perspective, future research 
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is needed to further develop the consequentialist versus nonconsequentialist perspectives 
and perhaps form a synthesis to this perceived dialectic.   
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APPENDIX A 
                TABLES 
          Table 1: Exploratory Factor Analysis and Scree Plot of Indecisiveness Scale 
 
Factor  Eigenvalue    % Of  Variance In The Observed Variances Accounted For By The Factor 
1      6.67     51.31 
2        .99       7.65 
3        .87       6.72 
4        .78       5.97 
etc… 
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Table 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis and Scree Plot of Nonconsequentialist Dysfunctional 
Decisional Coping Behavior Scale. 
 
   Factor      Eigenvalue     % Of  Variance In The Observed Variances Accounted For By The Factor 
1 3.19     53.19 
2   .91     15.29 
3   .62     10.33 
4   .56       9.46 
5   .39       6.59 
6   .30       5.11 
 
 
 
Scree Plot
Component Number
654321
Ei
ge
nv
al
ue
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
.5
0.0
 
 
 
 
 
 
   79
Table 3: Exploratory Factor Analysis And Scree Plot Of The Three Factors Of Difficult 
Decisions Questionnaire (TFDDQ) 
 
   Factor      Eigenvalue     % Of  Variance In The Observed Variances Accounted For By The Factor 
1 4.43     36.94 
2 1.70     14.18 
3 1.35     11.26 
4 1.10       9.17 
5   .77       6.45 
6   .56       4.64 
etc… 
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TABLE 4:  CORRELATIONS 
 
Variables                               Mean       s.d.   1       2             3              4                5   
 
1. Indecisiveness                                               38.07     13.23   (.92)     .147**        .581**           .044             .085*              
 
2. Decisional Coping (NDDCBS)                    14.58       6.03         (.83)          .099*            .088*           .005 
       
3. Difficult Decisions (TFDDQ)                     42.68     10.19            (.82)  .063            .059            
 
4. Logic Subscale                       30.59 5.73        (.75)              -.133**
  
5. Emotions Subscale                                 34.40 8.07              (.79) 
*  p< .05 
**  p< .001 
Alpha Cronbach reliabilities on diagonal and in parenthesis   
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TABLE 5:  MODERATION 
 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining The Moderating Effect Of Decisional Self- 
Efficacy On The Relationship Between Difficult Decisions And Indecisiveness a 
  
                          
 
Models                                   M1       M2          M3        M4        M5           M6      M7    
 
 
Centered Variablesb 
 
Decisional self-efficacy                         -.143     -.038    -.135     -.233       -.140       -.109    .209 
Preference instability     .927   .849      .927       .933       .946 .889    .851    
Anticipated regret                       2.08*     2.12*    2.08*     2.06*     2.11*      2.10*  2.11*        
Preference uncertainty      .935   .989      .935       .902       .922 .986    .939        
Poor structure      .263    .330      .267       .310       .226 .240    .385 
Incomparable alternatives     .041   .021      .042      -.016       .063 .086       -.058 
Interactions using centered variables 
  
Decisional self-efficacy X  Preference instability              -1.34         .270 
Decisional self-efficacy X  Anticipated regret           -.130       .942 
Decisional self-efficacy X  Preference uncertainty            .585      .302 
Decisional self-efficacy X  Poor structure               -.558     .733 
Decisional self-efficacy X  Incomparable alternatives       -.698       .787 
 
a. Entries are betas 
b. Dependent Variable: Indecisiveness  
*    p < .05 
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TABLE 6:  MEDIATION 
OLS Estimates of the Mediation Effect of Indecisiveness on the Relationship Between Difficult  
Decisions and Nonconsequentialist Dysfunctional Decisional Coping Behavior. (N=465)  
  
                              _____________                                                        _    
Variabled                       r                F                Sig          R2        Adj. R2      Change in R2     Conditions      
 
Preference Instability                  .143*          5.74      .017 
 
Anticipated Regret                      .111*          9.68      .002 
 
Preference Uncertainty               .110*          5.68      .018 
   
Poor Structure                             .086†          3.45            .064 
  
Incomparable Alternatives          .077††        2.78      .096 
 
Difficult Decisions TFDDQ      .147**      10.17            .002          .022       .021                                       1 
 
Coping Behavior NDDCB                      235.75            .000          .337       .336               .337   
Regress nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping behavior on difficult decisions.          2 
Difficult decisions TFDDQ                        4.57           .033          .010        .009 
 
Main Effects:
Regress nonconsequentialist dysfunctional decisional coping behavior on both the                           3 
difficult decisions and the indecisiveness.  
Indecisiveness, β = .579, t = 15.120, p<.05 
Difficult Decisions, β = .014, t = .366, p= .714    
c. re betas 
d. nt Variable: Indecisiveness  
 *   ** p< .001;  † p< .064; ††  p< .096  
82 
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APPENDIX B 
FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1: NONCONSEQUENTIALIST DECISION-MAKING MODEL: MEDIATION  
HNonconsequentialist 
Dysfunctional 
Decisional Coping 
Behavior (NDDCB)   
83 
Selection difficulty: 
Preference Uncertainty  
Poorly Structured Decisions    
Incomparable Alternatives 
Anticipated Regret 
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Preference Instability
  Difficult Decisions  
H 12: Mediation  
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FIGURE 2: NONCONSEQUENTIALIST DECISION-MAKING MODEL 
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FIGURE 3: CONSE TIALIST PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Outcome  
Anticipated 
Outcomes
Subjective 
Probabilities
Cognitive
Evaluatio Decision
Emotions
Source: Anderson, C. J. 2003. The Psychology of D othing: Forms of Decision Avoidance Result From   
Reason and Emotion. Psychological Bulletin, 129( -167. 
 
 QUEN
 
n
oing N
1): 139
  86
                                                         
FIGURE 4: CONSEQUENTIALIST  ANTICIPATED REGRET MODEL 
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FIGURE 5: NONCONSEQUENTIALIST M  
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FIGURE 6: RATIONAL-EMOTIONAL L 
 
 
 
Actual 
Outcome 
(including 
emotion) 
Expected 
Outcomes
(including 
anticipated 
emotions)
Subjective 
Probabilities
Computational 
Evaluation
Be r or 
A nce
Concurrent 
Emotions
Task Context 
and person 
Factors
Source: Anderson, C. J. 2003. The Psychology of Doing Nothing: For ecision Avoidance Result From   
Reason and Emotion. Psychological Bulletin, 129(1): 139-167. 
 
  MODE
havio
voida
ms of D
  89
89 
 
 
FIGURE 7: PARTICIPANT PROCEDURE 
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APPENDIX C 
 MEASURES 
SCALE 1: INDECISIVENESS SCALE                                                                                                   
(NAME OF QUESTIONNAIRE DID NOT APPEAR ON MATERIAL GIVEN TO SUBJECTS) 
Please continue to answer these questions with regard to how you currently feel about the "big" 
decision you are facing. Carefully read each of the following statements and use the 6-point scale. 
 
 
Please reflect on your decision 
and be as honest as possible 
when answering the questions.
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Strongly 
Agree  
6 
1 Because of this decision I feel 
incapable of …    
2 I get a lot of negative …   
3 Though this is a big decision I feel …   
4 I am feeling …   
5 Thinking about committing …   
6 At this point, I am …   
90 
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 Please reflect on your decision and 
be as honest as possible when 
answering the questions.
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Strongly 
Agree  
6 
7 I feel …   
8 I cannot think …   
9 I am having …   
10 I feel …   
11 I feel emotionally …   
12 I feel comfortable …   
13 I feel I cannot …   
91 
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SCALE 2: DECISION-MAKING STRATEGY QUESTIONNAIRE                                                                           
(NAME OF QUESTIONNAIRE DID NOT APPEAR ON MATERIAL GIVEN TO SUBJECTS) 
We are interested in the process you are going through to make a decision. Think about your current "big" 
decision, and for each statement below, indicate how much you agree or disagree using the following 6-point 
scale. 
  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Strongly 
Agree  
6 
1 One or more of my choices just … 
2 My emotions … 
3 I have made … 
4 In the end I will … 
5 My first "gut" … 
6 I have rationally … 
7 No option "feels" … 
8 For this decision… 
9 I will make a decision … 
10 I have made a mental … 
11 My intuition … 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Strongly 
Agree  
6 
12 I will choose my decision based on … 
13 When it “feels” right… 
14 The logical or rational choice … 
15 Certain choices … 
16 I have and/or will plan … 
17 My first instinct … 
18 I am no longer … 
19 I will make this decision … 
20 I will evaluate the importance … 
21 I will rationally and systematically …  
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SCALE 3: NONCONSEQUENTIALIST DYSFUNCTIONAL DECISIONAL COPING BEHAVIOR 
QUESTIONNAIRE                                                                                                                        
(NAME OF QUESTIONNAIRE DID NOT APPEAR ON MATERIAL GIVEN TO SUBJECTS) 
Please continue to answer these questions with regard to how you currently feel about the "big" 
decision you are facing. Carefully read each of the following statements and use the 6-point scale. 
 
Please reflect on your decision and be as 
honest as possible when answering the questions.
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Strongly 
Agree  
6 
1 I am willing to make … 
2 I am now trying to cope … 
3 This decision has emotionally … 
4 I am now trying to cope … 
5 I am willing to make any decision… 
6 I am willing to sacrifice … 
94 
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SCALE 4: THREE FACTORS OF DIFFICULT DECISIONS QUESTIONNAIRE                                    
(NAME OF QUESTIONNAIRE DID NOT APPEAR ON MATERIAL GIVEN TO SUBJECTS) 
95 
The following statements are based on your feelings of indecisiveness that you are experiencing now. 
Carefully read the first sentence and each of the following statements, and please respond according to 
the following 6-point scale.  
  
 
My feelings of 
indecisiveness have 
been due to:
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Strongly 
Agree  
6 
1 ...Not being able…   
2 ...the potential regret …   
3 ...my fear…   
4 ...consistently …   
5 ...the lack of …   
6 ...lack of …   
7 ...my confusion …   
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 Please reflect on your 
decision and be as honest as 
possible when answering the 
questions.
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Strongly 
Agree  
6 
8 ...having no l…    
9 ...not knowing why …   
10 ..not knowing which …   
11 ...not knowing which choice …   
96  
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SCALE 5: DECISIONAL SELF-EFFICACY SCALE                                                                        
(NAME OF QUESTIONNAIRE DID NOT APPEAR ON MATERIAL GIVEN TO SUBJECTS) 
Please continue to answer these questions based on how you currently feel about the "big" 
decision you are currently facing. Carefully read each of the following statements and use the 
6-point scale. 
 
Please reflect on your decision and be 
as honest as possible when answering the 
questions.
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Strongly 
Agree  
6 
1 I am confident that I can resolve this decision.  
2 I am unable to deal with such a decision.  
3 I feel insecure about having to make this decision.  
4 I doubt that I will be able to make a good decision.  
5 I have the resources necessary to handle this decision.  
6 I am confident I will make the best choice possible with regards to this important decision.  
7 I am confident that course of action I will select will be the correct one.  
8 I am confident in my ability to handle this decision.  
9 I feel pessimistic about finding a good solution.  
10 I admit to myself that I CANNOT deal with this, and may quit trying.  
97  
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